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Abstract 
This thesis examines the problem of election-related violence through a number of 
meta-theories, which have recently emerged in the social sciences to explain intra-
state conflicts. By using the case study of the 2002 elections in the Highlands 
region of Papua New Guinea (PNG), this thesis examines the applicability and 
usefulness of primordialism, modernization theory and weak state theory in 
explaining election-related violence in PNG. 
Critically examining the theories, the thesis analyses a wide range of information 
about the historical, cultural, social and political factors that played a significant 
role in the surfacing of election-related violence in the PNG Highlands. By 
highlighting the dynamics between these various aspects, the thesis argues that 
none of the existing theories has the capacity to fully conceptualize election-
related violence in PNG. 
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Introduction 
On 16 September 1975, Papua New Guinea (PNG) became an independent 
sovereign nation. It was within the 'third wave of democratisation' 1 (Huntington, 
1991, p 24) that PNG, a former Australian colony, made a transition from a set of 
hitherto acephalous (literally means headless) tribal societies towards a 
modernising state governed by the principles of democracy. With the new 
constitution, which was drafted by the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), 
PNG adapted a Westminster-style parliamentary system with a unicameral 
parliament; 109 members from 89 Open electorates and 20 Regional electorates 
(nineteen provinces and the National Capital District) are elected for five-year 
terms by universal suffrage. National elections have been held since 19642 ; the 
last election was held in 2002 (Reilly, 1999, p 226; May, 2003a, p 2; Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007, online). 
Papua New Guinea represents one of the few post-colonial developing nations 
that has maintained an unbroken record o~ democratic government since its 
independence. It has held regular elections on schedule with a relatively high level 
of participation and candidature. Changes of government have been peaceful and 
have followed constitutional procedures. The judiciary has maintained its 
1 The American and French Revolutions provided the impetus for the first democratic wave (1828-
1926) that ended shortly after World War I. The second wave (1943-1962) was precipitated by the 
struggle against fascism during World War II and the collapse of European colonialism in Africa 
and Asia. The transition of former communist countries and Third World countries towards 
democratic governance initiated the third wave of democratisation (1974-) that is still underway 
(Huntington, 1991, pp 16-26; Handelman, 2003, pp 32-33). 
2 During the colonial rule national elections were held for the House of Assembly in 1964, 1968 
and 1972, which led to formal self-government in 1973 and independence in 1975 (May, 2004, p 
129-132; Standish, 1994, p 57). 
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independence. There has been no military coup and there is a vibrant free press 
(May, 2006a, p 151; Reilly,2002a, p 703). 
Yet, despite these conventional indicators of democratic longevity that may 
suggest political stability, the state of PNG not only remains weak, but it also 
faces serious challenges as its political institutions have increasingly become 
vulnerable to non-democratic pressures, including frequent turnover of 
governments and national elections characterised by political unrest (May, 2003a, 
p 1). Contrary to the opinion of some scholars3, who tend to equate PNG's 
unbroken record of democratic government with a democratic success, others 
suggest that political development in PNG has resulted in 'political decay' owing 
to a downward trend in maintaining democracy and its principles (Gelu, 2003, p 
4). One of the most obvious manifestations of 'political decay' is the conduct of 
national elections. Recent general elections have been marred by an increasing 
level of violence and procedural malpractices. Election-related violence, which 
some see as an 'accepted and necessary evil' of the political process (Ketan, 2000, 
p 44, 48), raises the question about the pr~spects for the continuing health and 
stability of democracy. 
Election-related violence can be broadly defined as 'any acts of violence that are 
intended to, or result in influencing electoral choices and electoral outcomes' 
(O'Grady, Lopez-Pintor & Stevens, 2007, online). Fisher (2002, online) provides 
a more specific definition. He defines election-related violence as "any random or 
3 Reilly (1999, p 225) argues that "on many indicators of democratic performance, PNG is one of 
the most successful democracies in the developing world". Similarly, Diamond (cited in Reilly, 
2002a, p 704) claims that Papua New Guinea's "remarkably vibrant and resilient democratic 
system" is" the most 'successful democracy of any of the 'Asian' developing countries". 
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organised act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral 
process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical 
assault, forced "protection", blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination". 
Election-related violence in PNG, notably in the Highlands region, has become a 
growing problem of order that challenges state authority and it represents a major 
impediment towards consolidating democracy. Over the decades, elections have 
become an arena of intense political competition not only for power, prestige, and 
status, but also for the benefits of modernity offered by the state (May, 2006a, p 
164). Individual candidates and their supporters often engage in violent clashes 
and resort to illegal practices in an effort to influence the electoral choices of 
voters and the outcome of elections in their favour, but also as a way to express 
their grievances. 
In the PNG Highlands, three types of election-related violence have been 
identified: conflict occurs during campaigning, polling and post elections. Pre-
polling violence includes any form of vio~ent act, ranging from abusive verbal 
exchanges to destruction of property and lives. Polling violence is partly the result 
of the logistical disorganisation of elections and electoral malpractice by the state, 
but much of the violence relates to interference with ballot boxes, and 
intimidation of both voters and electoral officers by candidates and their 
supporters. Post-polling conflicts are characterised by fighting between suppmters 
of rival candidates and retributive violence, occasionally leading to full-scale 
inter-group warfare (Dinnen, 2001, pp 162-169; Ketan, 2004, pp 284-288). 
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Although election-related violence became apparent during the 1980s (Strathern, 
1993a, p 48), since the 1992 national elections it has intensified to such level that 
there seems to be a tendency in scholarly discourse to talk of 'gun-point 
democracy' (Standish, 1996), 'non-liberal democracy' (Gelu, 2000) and 
'disorderly democracy' (May, 2003a). In 1997, the Electoral Commission 
(PNGEC) reported that "the 1997 election was the most violent ever" (cited in 
Gelu, 2000, p 106). Yet, worse was to come. In 2001, John Paska, PNG Trades 
Union Congress general secretary, said "the general belief is that the 2002 
election will bear witness to a degree of volatility never before experienced in 
PNG" (National, 14 June 2001). As Paska predicted, the 2002 national elections 
turned out to be the 'worst and darkest' in PNG's short democratic history (Post-
Courier, 02 August 2002). Although fighting was reported nationwide, election-
related violence became the most disturbing phenomenon in the five Highlands 
provinces: Southern Highlands Province (SHP), Enga, Chimbu, Western 
Highlands Province (WHP) and Eastern Highlands Province (EHP)4. 
Threats, intimidation, violence, hijacking ~nd destruction of ballot boxes and 
hostage taking were characteristics of the 2002 Highlands elections. In Enga 
province thirty armed men stormed the Wabag police station and dynamited ballot 
boxes destroying thousands of ballot papers (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p 3; 
'Tanim', 2003). In WHP a group of candidates made a plea to the Governor-
General to stop the poll before it sunk into a civil war (Post-Courier, 20 June 
2002, p 1). Chimbu province was declared a 'fighting zone' (National, 28 June 
2002, p 1), followed by SHP where elections had been so chaotic that for the first 
4 See map on p, ix. Other areas such as Lae and Port Moresby also experienced some cases of 
violence, although not to the extent as the Highlands. 
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time in the nation's history the Electoral Commission failed the elections in six 
electorates5 and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) had to be called out in an 
effort to restore law and order (National, 10 July 2002, p 1; Post-Courier, 10 July 
2002, p 1). The 2002 national elections in the Highlands, which by and large were 
controlled under the barrel of the gun, claimed a number of casualties. Although 
there are no exact figures, Standish (2003, p 143) estimates that the 2002 elections 
in the Highlands claimed as many as 100 lives. 
The snapshot of the 2002 national elections in the Highlands outlined above is to 
be understood as part of a broader problem that confronts the PNG state. The 
structural changes in PNG's administration and legal reforms during the colonial 
era were inadequate and perhaps inappropriate as a means to 'modernise' 
Highlands societies, which were governed by deep-rooted traditional values that 
. are many thousands of years old. Despite the imposition of a Western model of 
democracy, PNG remains characterised by a parochial political culture that is 
largely driven by traditionalism. Clan solidarity and political patronage, 
sometimes bordering on "kleptocracy" (K.etan, 2000, p 53), overrides all other 
aspects of politics. What has emerged is a weak state that lacks legitimacy and 
power to penetrate society, and the consequential lack of capacity to deliver goods 
and services to the people. The manifestation of a weak state is economic decline 
and societal malfunctioning that poses considerable challenges for the stability of 
PNG. 
5 The electorates concerned were Kagua-Erave Open, Tari Open, Komo-Magarima Open, 
Imbonggu Open, Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open and Southern Highlands Provincial (Nonggorr, 
2006, pp 7-8). . 
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Documenting the extent of this challenge has proved elusive. However, the Fund 
for Peace, an international research and educational organisation, has recently 
produced an annual Failed States Index (FSI). The purpose of the FSI is to assess 
countries against a set of indicators and determine whether or not they are failed 
states. According to the Fund for Peace (2007, online), PNG scores high (84.6 out 
of 120 points) on the FSI of 2006. This relatively high indicator of state failure 
demonstrates that the PNG state is weak and it may have the potential to become a 
failing or failed state (Tulkiewicz, 2006). 
Internal conflict has been identified as one of the main reasons why nation-states 
fail (Rotberg, 2003, p 1). Internal conflict that takes the form of tribal and clan 
clashes are frequent in PNG and intensify during election times. Such internal 
conflicts pose a great threat to PNG's already fragile stability. Therefore, 
understanding the underlying causes of election-related conflict is crucial to 
prevent PNG from deteriorating further. This is especially the case since, 
throughout the 1990s, Western foreign policy makers have increasingly become 
preoccupied with state-building assistance. to their non-Western counterparts in an 
effort to avoid potential threats posed by weak and failing states6• Concerns about 
security and development now predominantly focus on the central role of the state 
and its ability to provide effective economic, social and political management 
(Chandler, 2006, pp 2-5). 
6Failing and failed states are genet:ally acknowledged as posing severe security threats as they are 
widely perceived as being the source of many of the world's most serious problems, from poverty 
to AIDS to drugs to terrorism (Krasner & Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Fukuyama, 2004, pix). 
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Such a role has posed a significant challenge for Australia because PNG occupies 
the crest of Australia's immediate north and east region which is described, albeit 
contentiously, as an "emergent arc of instability"7 (Rumley, Forbes & Griffin, 
2006, p 1). Given its geographical proximity8, the country's stability is important 
for Australia as well as the South Pacific region. In order to prevent PNG from 
becoming a failed state, Australia provides PNG with approximately $300 million 
in aid each year (AusAID, 2000, p 7). Aid programs focus on two main areas, 
accelerating economic growth and fostering functioning and effective states 
(AusAID, 2006, p 34, 42). Deteriorating law and order, however, has generally 
been recognised as a major economic and social development constraint 
(AusAID, 2003a, pp 11-12; Chand, 2003, online; World Bank, 2004, p 26; Morris 
& Stewart, 2005, online). For the aid programs to be effective, it is important to 
address and understand law and order problems, of which tribal conflict is a major 
part. 
The purpose of this honours thesis is to explore and analyse the broader problems 
that underlie election-related violence in PNG. To do so, this thesis will attempt to 
conceptualise election-related violence by using the 2002 Highlands election as a 
case study. Owing to the complexity of the problem, a coherent analysis requires a 
multi-theoretical approach with the capacity to examine both sociological and 
political aspects of violence and the ways in which these aspects intertwine. 
7 Rumley (2006, pp 17-18) contests the term "arc of instability". He argues that the concept, which 
now appears in government reports and has been made popular by the media, is an 
overgeneralisation and perhaps an exaggeration. He argues that the concept of "arc" is both an 
unhealthy metaphor and an artificial construct because countries located in Australia's immediate 
region are not equally unstable. Furthermore, he argues that "vulnerability" rather than 
"instability" is a more appropriate expression. 
8 See map on'p, ix. · 
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Despite the fact that election-related violence is increasingly becoming a global 
occurrence, especially in deyeloping nations9, an integrated theoretical perspective 
has yet to be fully advanced within the social sciences to comprehensively explain 
it. Consequently, the analytical framework of this thesis is built upon two theories, 
ethnic conflict and weak state theory. The study of four prominent social 
scientists, Clifford Geertz, Robert H. Bates, Donald L. Horowitz and Robert I. 
Rotberg, provides the basis of a multi-disciplinary and integrated explanation of 
election-related violence. 
Although, as the case study of PNG will show, these two theories occasionally 
overlap, for the purpose of this thesis they will be applied separately. Whereas 
ethnic conflict theory is used to explain the sociological aspects of violence, weak 
state theory provides a template for establishing a link between institutional 
deficiencies of the state and election-related violence. Although some scholars use 
the term 'ethnic conflict' in relation to PNG10, it is important to note that election-
related violence is not necessarily ethnic group conflictll. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of an alternative theory specific t? PNG, ethnic conflict theory seems the 
most appropriate sociological perspective. 
9 Among countries scheduled for elections in 2002, 19 have experienced previous election 
violence: The Gambia, Republic of Congo, Cambodia, Colombia; Zimbabwe, Chad, Armenia, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Georgia, Haiti, Albania, 
Guinea, Macedonia, Madagascar, and Ukraine (Fisher, 2002, online). This list, however, does not 
include Papua New Guinea, which indicates that there are potentially more countries marred by 
conflict during elections. 
10 See Reilly (2000) 'Democracy, ethnic fragmentation, and internal conflict'. 
11 Inter-group conflict in the Highlands occurs between candidates' support bases. Standish (2007, 
pp 139-140) notes that often the vote bases of many candidates share a common culture and 
language; hence they cannot be regarded as separate ethnic groups. 
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Ethnic conflict theory is a relatively new area within the social sciences that 
emerged in the post-World War II era12. Ethnic conflict theory is, in fact, a mega 
theory that draws extensively on existing perspectives of ethnic phenomena. 
These existing theoretical perspectives include primordialism, modernisation, 
class analysis and cultural pluralism (Horowitz, 2000, p 96; Conteh-Morgan, 
2004, p 197). The lack of well-established social classes in PNG, especially the 
apparent lack of the middle class, renders the task of analysing election-related 
violence in terms of the economic interest of various social classes difficult. 
Similarly, cultural pluralism cannot be applied to the analysis because Highlands' 
societies do not exhibit wide cultural differences, as their value and belief patterns 
conform to the broad Melanesian culture. Therefore, this thesis will only use two 
aspects of ethnic conflict theory, primordialism and modernisation. These will be 
combined with weak state theory to analyse the 2002 national elections in the 
PNG Highlands. 
The thesis is built from a variety of resources that include both primary and 
secondary research materials. Secondary ~esources are used when examining 
theoretical explanations and the socio-political, historical and cultural background 
of PNG. Secondary resources include books and journal articles. Originally, the 
impetus of this thesis was set by the book titled 'Australia's arc of instability: The 
political and cultural dynamics of regional security' (2006) co-edited by Dennis 
Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin. Some notable authors 
12 The post-World War II period, particularly the ending of the Cold War era has witnessed a 
dramatic shift in the nature of warfare. This shift was marked by the decline in interstate conflicts 
and dramatic increase in conflicts within the state, which now make up more than 95 per cent of all 
conflicts mostly in developing countries (Human Security Report, 2005, online). These intrastate 
conflicts have come to be labelled as 'ethnic conflicts', which refers to inter-group conflicts within 
the state. · 
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whose work has shaped this thesis include Bill Standish, Sinclair Dinnen, Ron J. 
May and Ben Reilly, who are all experts on various aspects of PNG. 
Primary resources are used when referring to the 2002 national elections. Primary 
resource materials include newspaper articles, published and unpublished 
government reports. The newspaper articles, which were published in PNG in the 
year of the election 2002, were compiled from three PNG newspapers, The 
National, The Post-Courier and The Independent. Copies of The Post-Courier 
were obtained from the National Library of Australia (Canberra). Copies of The 
National and The Independent were kindly lent by Dr Bill Standish. 
A comprehensive analysis of election-related violence requires a sound 
understanding of PNG culture. As argued by Yin (2003, p 59) researchers need to 
have a firm grasp about the issues being studied to be able to correctly collect and 
analyse relevant data. Chahal and Daloz (2006, p 11) observe that political actions 
are often influenced by cultural factors such as custom, values and beliefs 
indicating the importance of taking cultur.al variables into account when 
examining politics. It is also believed that "violence is understood best when it is 
examined over a range of cultural settings, and in a full variety of social 
institutions" (Riches, 1986, p vii). In an attempt to provide a comprehensive study 
of election-related violence this thesis will also incorporate many insights made 
available by Anthropology. 
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The main problem to be examined in the thesis is: 
~ To what extent can election-related violence in PNG be explained 
by using aspects of ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory? 
This problem will be approached ~hrough a set of four research questions: 
1) What is the extent of conflict as a source of political 
violence? 
2) To what extent can primordialism and modernisation 
explain the prevalence of election violence? 
3) How does the weak capacity of the PNG state contribute to 
election-related violence? 
4) How does the case study of the 2002 national elections in 
the Highlands contribute to an understanding of the need 
for a synthesis of sociological, anthropological and political 
theories? 
This thesis is organised according to a linear-analytic structure, which is a 
standard approach recommended for theses (Yin, 2003, pp. 152-153). This thesis 
is divided into this introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter 
provides a brief historical overview of tribal warfare and the way fighting has 
translated into modem politics in the form of election-related violence. By using 
the 2002 national election in the Highlands as a case study, sociological and 
political aspects of election-related violence placed in a theoretical framework 
will be examined in chapters two and three respectively. Findings and 
recommendations in relation to the theories will be presented in the conclusion. 
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Chapter One: History of warfare 
"Fightinghas always been here. It's part of our life. Heh, heh. 
Enga custom! It's a part of our life . 
. . .it won't end. Fighting won't end. 
Why? Because we are born with it. And we will die with it. It's our 
custom." 
(Cited in Dorney, 2002, p 121) 
Ethnographic accounts have demonstrated that tribal warfare, an important sphere 
of competition, has long been present in the PNG Highlands. Whereas tribal 
fighting in traditional society was the outcome of disputes that predominantly 
centred on the oft-cited trio of land, women and pigs, in modem society it has 
increasingly become associated with state institutions such as elections. Elections 
have become a new arena of competition whereby local groups or group of 
individuals often engage in destructive military practices as a means to succeed or 
exact revenge for defeat. Election-related violence, as one manifestation of 
modem warfare is, in fact, an altered continuation of traditional practices. 
To understand the circumstances from which election-related violence has 
emerged, this chapter presents a brief historical overview of tribal warfare. The 
chapter starts by explaining some essential information on the structure of society 
and traditional leadership. It then provides a discussion on pre-colonial tribal 
warfare, the resurgence of fighting at the end of the colonial era and its causes, 
and the emergence of a new leadership and arena of competition brought about by 
colonialism and modernisation. 
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The Highlands provinces comprised of loosely structured and acephalous 
(stateless) societies charact~rised by a segmentary structure13, in which 
individuals belong to progressively more inclusively named groups. According to 
their size, the following social groupings can be distinguished: phratry, tribe, clan, 
sub-clan, sub-sub-clan and lineages (Ketan, 1996, p 243). Tribes are the most 
coherent and autonomous social and political formations that occupy or claim a 
certain territory (Royal Anthropological Institute, 1951, p 66). Tribes can be sub-
divided into clans and can form a phratry with a tradition of common descent. In 
certain areas, for example in Mount Hagen (WHP), tribes are the main political, 
ceremonial and military units (Ketan, 1996, p 247). These functions, however, are 
transferred to the clan level if the tribes are too big, as it is the case in Chimbu 
where tribal groupings can number up to 5,000 people (Standish, 1992, p 28). 
Clans are the fundamental social formations in which membership is usually 
acquired through unilineal and patrilineal descent, although there are cases when 
membership is based on cognatic descent 14 (Standish, 1992, pp 27-28; Ketan, 
1996, p 244). Ideally, clans are exogamous (people marry from outside the group), 
but in certain areas, for example, in the E~stern Highlands, endogamy (marriage 
within the group) is largely accepted and practiced (Feil, 1987, pp 75-76). 
Although pre-colonial societies had no overarching central authority or any form 
of 'state', certain individuals of high prominence were bestowed with political and 
social leadership roles. These men came to be known as 'big men'. The 'big men' 
13 As opposed to a hierarchical political structure, segmentary political structures are characterised 
by the principle of equality. Different segments at each level of society are equal and correspond to 
one another (Eriksen, 2001, pp 163-164). 
14 Generally speaking descent in the Highlands is agnatic (father-to-son). Whereas in patrilineal 
descent system transmission of membership takes place through the male line, in cognatic systems 
kin group membership can be acquired through both mother's and father's side (Eriksen, 2001, p 
97). . 
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theory was first put forward by Marshall Sahlins (1963), who contrasted a self-
made 'big men' leadership jn Melanesia with that of inherited chieftainship in 
Polynesia. Sahlins identified a big man with a bourgeois entrepreneur, who could 
manipulate his followers as well as wealth to obtain social credit and prestige. 
Sahlins' s typology of big man was essentially based on meritocratic attributes. He 
argued that the power of a big man was personal power that rested with him as a 
person rather than with the position. Big man status was attained through 
individual actions and skills such as magical powers, exceptional rhetorical skills, 
fighting ability, generosity and loyalty (Sahlins, 1963, pp 206-208). 
Sahlins's 'big man' model has received some criticism. In an influential paper, 
Standish (1978), for example argued that in pre-colonial times not only 
meritocratic factors but also a 'hereditary advantage' played a significant role in 
attaining a leadership status (Standish, 1978, p 33). Such reconsideration suggests 
that the position of a big man is not acquired solely through his personal actions 
as proposed by Sahlins. Nevertheless, it is argued that leadership was more 
usually achieved than inherited (Dinnen ~Thompson, 2004, p 2). 
Additionally, Sahlins's model assessed leadership positions against a generalised 
set of formula. However, research conducted in various areas points to different 
types of leaders. In Western Highlands, big men were those who excelled in 
economic transactions in ceremonial exchanges, possessed good financial 
standing and great rhetorical skills and were generous (Ketan, 2004, pp 71-72). In 
contrast, in the Eastern Highlands, where ceremonial exchanges were given less 
emphasis and where tribal hostility permeated society, big men were aggressive 
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warriors (Feil, 1987, p 65). Among the Maring (Madang), big men were wealth 
transactors and shamans, wl;10 possessed esoteric knowledge concerning fighting 
(Rappaport, 1984, p 29). Therefore, it can be argued that traditional leadership 
varied according to certain social customs and practices adopted in different areas. 
Life in traditional Highlands' societies was to a large extent characterised by 
intense competition and co-operation between groups. An important arena of 
these corporate activities was warfare. Government records and missionary 
recollections from early colonial encounters indicate a great level of belligerence 
between groups that constantly engaged in warfare with the destruction of lives 
and property (Standish, 1992, p 34). From the late 1950s ethnographers began 
conducting research on New Guinea Highlands ":'arfare (Knauft, 1990, pp 265-
I 
266). The reconstructive accounts made available by anthropologists substantiate 
Andrew Strathern's claim (1977, p 135) that prior to the Australian 
administration, warfare was so endemic in the PNG Highlands region that in fact 
it was an expected part of a people's life. 
Early ~xplanation of warfare has been made from a functional ecological 
viewpoint. Mervyn Meggitt (1977), who conducted his research among the Mae 
Enga, produced a classic study in relation to the social formations that entail 
warfare. Meggitt distinguished four different types of fighting, warfare between 
phratries, intraclan fighting, fighting between clans of one phratry and warfare 
between clans of different phratries 15. The intensity of fighting was regulated by 
agnation. Intraclan fighting (between 'brothers') operated under strong constraints 
15 A phratry is a loose social organisation above the tribal level, and refers to an alliance of tribes. 
Ketan (2004, p 107) .calls these groupings "coalition-style alliances", which are based on military 
alliances. They started to form in the early 1970s to achieve specific goals. 
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in an effort to prevent total warfare, but combat between clans of different 
phratries (with increased segmentary distance between disputants) was 
unrestrained, and consequently could result in all-out warfare (Meggitt, 1977, pp 
16-43). Meggitt argued (1977, pp 10-14) that it was primarily the combination of 
high population density and land shortage that prompted groups to fight. Violence 
in this sense was a means to acquire land through eviction, but also a means to 
protect a group's patrimonial estate. 
The ecological perspective of warfare had, however, soon become a subject of 
criticism. An empirical critique of land shortage explanations was compiled by 
Paul Sillitoe (1977). By using available census data for some regions and 
informants' statements collected by ethnographers, Sillitoe concluded that in 
majority of the cases disputes between members of different political groups 
rather than land shortage was the underlying cause of war. Sillitoe substantiated 
his claim with findings which revealed that victors often did not occupy their 
enemy's land due to fear of the latter's ancestor spirits. Sometimes, victors invited 
their defeated counterparts back to occupy their homeland. Additionally, he 
argueg that persistent warfare occurred in. areas of moderate population density 
and abundant land supply (Sillitoe, 1977, pp 71-79). 
While Sillitoe did not rule out the acquisition of land as an aim of warfare, he 
shifted the argument by pointing to disputes between different parties as the 
immediate cause of fighting. Although he did not specify, later research revealed 
that in traditional times it was the oft-cited trio of land, pigs and women (wealth 
items) over which disputes predominantly arose (McLeod, 2002, p 155; Yala, 
2002, p 7). Disputes could be settled in peaceful and violent ways, both regarded 
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as a legitimate response to grievances. Traditional methods of dispute settlement 
subscribe to what McLeod (2002, p 143) calls a "sliding scale of justice". These 
include negotiation, mediation, violent self-help, compensation, payback and 
warfare. In PNG, compensation is the most popular method of addressing a 
grievance with the primary purpose being restitution and reconciliation. If 
compensation, which almost always preceded warfare, failed to alleviate 
grievances, disputes escalated to tribal war (McLeod, 2002, pp 150, 155). Besides 
unsuccessful dispute settlements, other factors such as the pride and dignity of the 
group, the affirmation of male identity and the social history of group enmity also 
played a significant role in resolving conflicts through violence (Standish, 1992, p 
112; Ketan, 2004, p 160; McLeod, 2002, p 160). 
Australian colonial governance did, at least for a period of time, successfully 
change the atmosphere of hostility by suppressing tribal fighting. The Highlands 
region was first explored in the early 1930s and its pacification started after 1945 
(Strathern, 1993a, p 42). The establishment of law and order became the colonial 
Administration's number one priority. Ini~ially, pacification had achieved its 
desired effect as statistical data revealed a decrease in warfare (Gordon & 
Meggitt, 1985, p 162). Several factors contributed to the fact that tribal fighting 
became less frequent during the 1950s and 1960s. The belief that the newcomers 
were ancestral spirits or "Sky People" (Strathern, 1977, p 137; Gordon & Meggitt, 
1985, p 163) made white people superior, but it was rather the understanding of 
the power of firearms and a desire for European objects that aided pacification. In 
addition, there was a strong tendency among certain local groups towards active 
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and willing cooperation in the establishment of peace (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 
164; Standish, 1992, p 38) .. 
However, pacification did not last for a long time, as the 1970s witnessed a 
resurgence of warfare. Tribal fighting reappeared in all five Highlands provinces 
and became especially widespread in Chimbu, Western Highlands and Enga 
(Strathern, 1977, p 135). The scale of fighting, believed to be greater than in pre-
colonial times (Strathern, 1977, p 136), prompted the government to appoint 
Phillip Paney to commission an inquiry to investigate tribal warfare in the 
Highlands. By distinguishing between long-term and short-term causes of 
fighting, the Paney report (1973) gave multiple reasons for the revival of warfare. 
Among the immediate causes leading to fight were land, sorcery, killings, women 
and pigs. Long-term determinants included kin-group loyalty and 'the need to 
fight' as a result of social, economic and political uncertainties that imposed 
pressure and created anxiety in the communities. However, the report emphasised 
that the prime cause of increased lawlessness in the Highlands was the 
ineffectiveness of introduced judicial and.administrative procedures dealing with 
disputes (Paney Report, 1973, pp 4-18). 
As the Paney repmt imglied, the social, economic and political changes brought 
about by colonialism had altered traditional life in ways, which had consequences 
for conflicts. Contact with Europeans resulted in a population increase due to 
medical services, improvements in diet and possibly aspects of mission influence. 
The increase in population contributed to demographic pressures as local groups 
grew and land shortage became apparent. Land shortage was further intensified by 
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the introduction of cash cropping. Increasing pressure on resources became 
associated with heightened intergroup tension. Disputes over the ownership and 
use of resources, in particular land and pigs, became frequent and were further 
aggravated by the legalisation of liquor sale (Strathem, 1977, pp 140-143; 
Meggitt, 1977, pp 162-163). 
On the legal front, the introduction of a formal legal system staffed with poorly 
trained and educated indigenous magistrates during the 1960s meant rigid and 
lengthy procedures, which often produced dissatisfactory outcomes for disputants 
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 76-82). Additionally, legal processes adapted from 
Australia did not take local customs and sanctions into consideration when 
handing down decisions. The question of compensation, which was usually 
Highlanders' most pressing requirement for settling disputes, was largely ignored 
(Paney Report, 1973, p 6; Standish, 1973, p 15). As a result of an ineffective 
judicial system, villagers preferred to resort to their traditional way of handling 
disputes by returning to violence. 
Besides the shortcomings of the legal system, inadequate police presence was also 
a contributory factor in the revival and spread of violence. The Paney report 
(1973, p 19) stressed that in rural areas the force was dangerously understaffed. 
Similarly to the legal field, the police were also short of experienced and trained 
officers and they lacked the basic equipment necessary for field operations 
(Standish, 1973, p 14). Additionally, there was a lack of co-operation and 
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consultation between the police and the Division of District Administration 
services 16, which further hindered effective operation (Paney Report, 1973, p 19). 
While institutional weaknesses in state structures facilitated the resurgence of 
tribal warfare, the adoption of firearms as technological innovations in the mid~ 
1980s have further intensified, and at the same time dramatically altered the 
nature of fighting, especially in terms of the rules of engagement (Ketan, 2004, p 
178). In pre-colonial times the primary tools of warfare were bows and arrows, 
spears and axes. Today, fights are fought with a range of lethal weapons including 
home-made guns, pistols, rifles and high-powered military weapons (McLeod, 
2002, p 156). Whereas traditional tribal fighting was spectacular, required logistic 
planning and was played-out in prepared positions on pre-arranged battlefields 
according to certain constraints, contemporary warfare has become characterised 
by raids and ambushes whereby combatants engage in indiscriminate killings 
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 153-154; Ketan, 2004, pp 182-183). The inevitable 
result of such shift in warfare practices is a high number of fatalities and injuries 
and a considerable destruction of property. Between 1988 and 1996 tribal warfare 
in Enga province claimed more than 300 lives. The estimated death toll from 
recent fighting in the Southern Highlands is also believed to be in the hundreds 
(Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 7). 
Another significant factor that has widened the scale of conflict was the 
imposition of a Western political system grafted onto a highly competitive 
Highlands political culture. While traditional causes of conflict remained intact, 
16 Australian colonial. control was based on the work of the Division of District Administration, 
which came under indigenous control in 1973 (Standish, 1973, p 12). 
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new causes of conflict were propelled by contemporary politics (Y ala, 2000, p 7). 
Political reforms initiated by the Australian administration served as the first steps 
towards democratisation. In the 1960s and 1970s, the establishment of state 
institutions, local government councils, provincial government and the national 
government, opened another arena of competition. The newly established national 
and provincial electorates encompassed many politically autonomous and 
competitive clans in single representational units. During the years, elections have 
become increasingly associated with warfare, as these groups came into 
competition over issues, such as funds for economic development, which are 
channelled through the new political system. The government came to be seen as 
a "king of super clan" (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 182). 
Just as the introduction of guns had shaped the nature of fighting, elections also 
impacted on the nature of warfare. Intensified competition during elections has 
gradually begun breaking down group unity. Whereas co-operation between 
alliances of clans and tribes was vital in pre-colonial times, clans of the same tribe 
came to oppose each other during electio:q.s (Ketan, 2004, p 158). For example, 
Strathern (1993b, 227) notes a considerable drift in the alliance between the 
Minembi and Kombukla tribes (Western Highlands) during the 1993 by-elections. 
The Minembi always helped its traditional ally the Kombukla to elect its member, 
consequently expected reciprocity. During the 1993 by-election, however, the 
Kombukla refused to support the new Minembi candidate, which angered the 
Minembi tribesmen such that they threatened to make war against them. Not only 
have traditional military alliances started drifting apart, but also the increasing 
number of candidates contesting elections has stimulated intra-clan fighting. 
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Moreover, the new political system contributed to the emergence of a new type of 
leadership. Whereas traditional big manship was earned through honour and 
reputation based on performance, modem leadership roles are gained either 
through working for or in government. Today, money and guns are the two 
significant factors that dominate the struggle for modem leadership. The "primacy 
of politics" (Dinnen, 2001, p 170) has created a perception that substantial wealth 
can be generated from being a politician. In return for the dispersal of state 
resources, all politicians receive support and power from their respective tribes 
and clans. In an effort to get their members elected, groups readily resort to the 
use of firearms, which are supplied by those with political ambitions. As Gibbs 
(2004, p 13) notes "We are witnessing new kinds of tribalism with a new type of 
leader who has access to guns and the ability to open or obstruct access to money 
and resources". These factors make politics a major source of conflict and 
violence. 
The imposition of a Western democratic model onto a traditional tribal society 
generated a process whereby the 'modem: and the 'traditional' merged. Election-
related violence, in effect, is another dimension of warfare that reflects the 
continuity of traditional competitions. It is the product of and a response to the 
forces of decolonisation and modernisation that brought along social and political 
development, subsequently transforming historically entrenched tribal fighting 
into a modem day warfare that intensifies during and after elections. It is the 
intensification of electoral competition that provides the setting for election-
related violence that reached its height during the 2002 national elections. As this 
chapter has demonstrated there is interplay between the traditional forms of 
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cultural and political violence. Accordingly, the analysis of election-related 
violence demands both sociplogical and political approaches, which are discussed 
in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter Two: Sociological explanations of election-related violence 
"SHP (Southern Highlands Province) people have gone mad", said the opinion 
page of The National (18 July 2002, p 8) referring to the extraordinary levels of 
violence and disruption that eventually led to 'failed elections' being declared in 
six of the nine electorates. Following the call for fresh elections in the Southern 
Highlands (Post-Courier, 2 August 2002, p 2), a group of 'angry community 
leaders' wrote a letter to Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare. The content of the 
letter (signed by all six leading candidates): 
"I'm giving the Somare-led government until4.06pm tomorrow (today) to 
declare the remaining seats .. .If we don't have a reply by 4.06 (close of 
business) tomorrow, then the Southern Highlanders will be a republic 
country ... More people will die. Roads will be blocked, more bridges will 
be blown up ... There would be "unimaginable bloodshed" ... Each tribe is 
armed to the teeth with all the modem military style weapons ... We're 
bringing the nation to its knees." 
(Post-Courier, 9 August 2002, p 2) 
While the SHP provides an extreme example, it is an illustration of the tense 
atmosphere that prevailed throughout the highlands provinces during the 2002 
national elections. 
A comprehensive analysis of violence within the electoral context requires the 
examination of both sociological and political aspects of conflictual relationships. 
The analytical focus of this chapter centres on the sociological explanations of 
violence, which are divided into two contending views: primordialism and 
modernisation. Whereas the primordial approach is based on emotive theories of 
conflict and the psychological sources of identity, modernisation theories provide 
a rational choice analysis (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, pp 197-199). To establish the 
extent to which violence during elections in the PNG Highlands reflects these 
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differing views, this chapter uses the study of three prominent social scientists, 
Clifford Geertz, Robert Bates and Donald Horowitz, as the basis of the analysis. 
Table 1: Summary of the argument of major theorists 
Primordialism Modernisation 
By emphasising the strength and non- Early modernisation theory Later modernisation theory 
rational character of social ties, the 
primordial approach explains why Regarded the process of By focusing on economic 
people are so strongly attached to 
modernisation as an motives, it provides a rational 
their ethnic groups. 
'evolutionary progression', analysis of ethnic group 
It focuses on the psychological which was believed to transform 
behaviour; why and how people 
sources of identity, which motivate small-scale solitary societies into 
can be galvanised into actions. 
group solidarity and violence. large-scale and impersonal Explains conflict in material 
societies. terms. Conflict results from the 
In-group versus out-group orientation: rational pursuit of the benefits of 
whereas intra-group relationships are Modernisation would result in the the modern state. 
marked by favouritism, inter-group emergence of new social strata. 
relationships demonstrate hostility Bates: 
and discrimination. The most 'detribalised' strata, 
• Ethnic identities are not 
educated elites in particular, would constant. They are 
Geertz: lead people away from ethnic responsive to 
• Ethnic identities are given affiliations. innovations and 
and flow from,cultural revitalisation. 
identities. Fading traditionalism would 
• Ethnic groups compete 
• The formation of civil state eventually lead to the end of ethnic for the benefits 
strengthens primordial competition, hence the generated by modernity. 
sentiments. disappearance of ethnic conflict. 
• In their pursuit for 
• The primacy of group power, elites organise 
solidarity in public affairs. competitive groupings, 
• Conflict results from inter- which take ethnic form . 
group competitions for • Groups follow if their 
relative group worth. demands for material 
~ rewards are satisfied by 
-----------
elites. 
Criticism Criticism Criticism 
Bates: Bates: Horowitz: 
• 0 It treats ethnic identities • The process of • The undue focus on the 
natural and constant. modernisation promotes role of elite ambitions 
• Whilst primordialism is ethnic groups formations. results in insufficient 
useful in explaining the Ethnic competition attention to the conflict 
persistence of ethnic endures as modernisation motives of non-elites. 
identities, it does not proceeds. • It does not explain why 
provide an adequate Horowitz: conflict occurs in less 
discussion of the role of • Ethnic affiliations remain modernised countries. 
political and economic strong in modernising • The realm of feelings, 
factors in shaping ethnic societies. rather than material 
identities. interests, provides a 
complete explanation of 
conflict motives of both 
elites artd non-elites. 
• Inter-group competition 
is driven by the desire 
to obtain positive social 
identity. 
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Primordialism emphasises the strength and non-rational character of certain social 
ties (Freeman, 1998, p 19). Clifford Geertz first proposed the application of 
primordialism to post-colonialstates 17• Geertz (1963, pp 109, 112-113) regarded a 
primordial attachment as one that derived from cultural 'givens' (blood, language, 
region, religion and custom). The 'givens', which were rooted in the non-rational 
foundation of personality, provided the basis of group solidarity. Communities 
based on primordial allegiances were characterised by a 'corporate sentiment of 
oneness', which had a deeply abiding strength in the post-colonial state (Geertz, 
1963, p 114). Geertz asserted that for many people in modernising societies, this 
'corporate feeling of oneness' remained a legitimate authority and much of the 
interest in public affairs took the form of an obsessive concern with the 
relationship to one's tribe, region or sect. Geertz argued that it was the formation 
of a civil state that stimulated primordial sentiments because it introduced a more 
efficient mechanism for the production of power, which is generated by and 
associated~~ern political institutions, into society over which various 
primordial groups fight (Geertz, 1963, pp 109-121). Geertz's analysis implies that 
conflict in modernising societies arises from competition for relative group worth, 
as to permit oneself to be ruled by other tribes is to submit to oppression and 
degradation (Geertz, 1963, p 127). 
17 The concept of primordialism was introduced in 1957 by American sociologist, Edward Shils, 
who differentiated between societies based on individualism and rationalism and societies 
characterised by communal solidarity. He argued that people had a 'primordial' attachment, which 
involved strong emotional ties that arose from socialisation and a basic sociocultural need for a 
sense of identity and belonging. Such attachments were to be found in families, primary groups 
and tribal societies (Van Krieken, Smith, Habibis, McDonald, Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p 
519; Freeman, 1998, p 19). 
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The primordial approach has attracted a number of critics, particularly from those 
theorists who established a ~ink between modernisation and ethnicity. 
Modernisation theorists challenge the primordial approach for treating ethnic 
identities as constant and ancient, ignoring the fact that they might respond to 
innovations and revitalisation. They see identity as malleable and circumstantial 
and also take exception to the tendency to underemphasize the role of elite 
manipulation (Bates, 1983, p 166; Freeman, 1998, pp 19-20; Conteh-Morgan, 
2004, p 198)18• As opposed to the primordial approach, modernisation theorists 
have sought to develop rational explanations of conflict. A number of strands can 
be identified within modernisation theory. 
Early modernisation theorists regarded ethnic allegiance as a historical 
anachronism oomed to disappear due to the forces of modernisation19. These 
sociologists eq ated modernisation with an "evolutionary progression" 
transforming s all and solitary communities into large and impersonal societies 
(Freeman, 1998, p 17). They put forward the concept of 'detribalisation', by 
which they meant that in the wake of urb~nisation and industrialisation the 
" 
emerging new social strata, the elite, would lead people away from kinship 
affiliations (Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Essentially, it was an optimistic approach as 
'detribalisation' asserted the disappearance of ethnicity, consequently putting an 
end to inter-group fighting. 
18 Geertz's analysis does not differentiate between the elite and non-elite in the modernising state. 
By arguing that identities were not fluid and shapeless, but clearly demarcated, and 'the network of 
primordial alliances and opposition' was the product of centuries of gradual crystallisation, Geertz 
had a tendency to treat identities as static (Geertz, 1963, pp 118-119). 
19 See Gupta (1978, p 34), who argued that tribalism, an impediment to modernisation, would be 
"gradually and cautiously eroded" by economic and political development. 
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A later modernisation theorist, Robert Bates, refuted the idea that ethnic 
competition would disappe(:lr and instead he argued, "ethnic groups persist largely 
because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and 
thereby satisfy the demands of their members" (Bates, 1983, p 161). Whilst Bates 
accepted Geertz's argument about the persistence of primordial sentiments, he did 
not believe in emotive explanations of conflict. According to Bates, conflict 
between groups derives above all from the competition over the benefits of 
modernisation, power and control over the distribution and allocation of 
resources. Bates argued that in the competition for power, elites manipulated 
ethnic identities in order to generate the support of their groups. Bates, however, 
did not explain conflict solely in terms of elite aspirations, but also of communal 
aspirations. He arguld that groups placed considerable social pressure on elites, as 
they only provided t~eir support as long as their demands for the benefits of 
modern state was satisfied by their elected member (Bates, 1983, pp 161-166). 
This perspective provides a different view from those of earlier theorists. In 
contrast to early modernisation theorists, later modernisation theory emphasised 
the importance of ethnic groups in mode~ising societies. In contrast to the 
primordial approach, this approach sought to explain conflict in material terms. 
Based on the range of existing theories, Donald Horowitz, a prominent political 
scientist, developed a paradigm of ethnic conflict. By examining theories of 
modernisation, Horowitz (2000, pp 102-105) concludes that modernisation theory 
is insufficient in explaining how ethnic diversity relates to political instability. 
Horowitz's criticism of modernisation theory is threefold. Firstly, he argues that 
contrary to the predictions of early optimists ethnic affiliations remain strong 
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(Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Secondly, Horowitz (2000, p 102) argues that 
modernisation theory unduly focuses on the role of modem elite ambitions, hence 
ignoring the conflict motives of non-elites. Thirdly, Horowitz (2000, pp 102-103) 
claims that the theory does not provide a convincing explanation as to why 
conflict occurs in the least modernised parts of the world. Whereas modernisation 
theorists focus on the economic motives in explaining conflict, Horowitz, along 
with Geertz, places more emphasis on self-affirmation. Horowitz (2000, p 146) 
asserts that inter-group competition is driven by a group drive to obtain positive 
social identity by competition and comparison with other groups. It is the fear of 
being dominated or suppressed that provides the rationale for group hostility 
(Horowitz, 2000, p 179). 
A brief examination of these th)oretical foundations of conflict reveals a lack of 
consensus in the field of social sciences as to what exactly ignites conflict. Whilst 
these theories have strong potential to highlight certain aspects of conflict 
motives, none of them is powerful enough to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of conflict on its own. The e~amination of conflict in PNG Highlands 
" 
where kinship affiliations and group solidarity are still prominent features of 
social existence, and where groups engage in volatile conflicts in order to gain 
access to the benefits of the modem state, cannot be confined to one approach; it 
requires a multi-layered sociological explanation. Consequently, PNG election 
violence has lacked a comprehensive theoretical analysis. In an attempt to 
conceptualise election violence, this chapter will examine the applicability and 
usefulness of the primordial approach and modernisation theories. 
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PNG was colonised by Great Britain and Germany in 1884. While Australia took 
over the responsibility of British Administration in 1906, and that of the German 
part in 1914 (Dorney, 1990, pp 38-39), given its geographical remoteness, the 
Highlands region was the last to be explored by the Australian Administration in 
the early 1930s. In fact, the PNG Highlands was the last contacted large tribal 
population on earth (Knauft, 1990, p 265). From the mid 1940s onwards 
Highlanders had experienced a dramatic pace of change and political and 
economic development driven first by cash cropping and plantation economy and 
later by the establishment of political institutions. Political education of people 
about Western democracy started in the late 1950s. Although the first local 
government councils in the HighlandJwere established in the 1960s, state 
institutions have been fully in place o/ ly since PNG gained independence in 1975 
(Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, pp 92-98; Strathern, 1993a, p 42). 
As previously noted, early modernisation theorists predicted that social changes 
would bring about the demise of ethnic groupings. However, the introduction of 
Highlands' societies to the modern econowy and western-style political system 
did not result in a "detribalised" society (Horowitz, 2000, p 97). Instead of 
destroying "communal particularism" (Melson & Wolpe, 1971, p 2), social 
mobilization of the Highlands region has resulted in what Strathern (1993a, p 48) 
calls "the process of neotribalisation". Neotribalisation is a manifestation of 
modern politics in Melanesia which, in the absence of basic social divisions and a 
strong party system, is essentially based around personal and group identities 
(May, 2004, p 45). · 
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The traditional fragmentation of Highlands' societies means that political 
activities at both local and national level have rema~ned organised along 
traditional structural lines: clans and tribes ranging from 1,500 to 10,000 people 
(Ketan, 1996, p 249; Standish, 2007, p 140). As a consequence, elections are 
competitions between clans and sometimes tribes. Electoral behaviours subscribe 
to the 'parochial handout mentality model' (Saffu, 1996, p 4) as electors, 
especially in the Highlands, often cast their votes along clan lines (May, 2006b, p 
108). Such voting behaviour reflects the imperative of clan loyalty. Most PNG 
people retain a primary attachment ~nd loyalty to their clan or tribal group, a 
phenomenon known as wantokism20 E~tandish, 1994, p 60). 
Whilst group solidarity and clan voting reflects Geertz' argument about 
primordial attachments in modernising societies, the concept of primordial has to 
be handled cautiously in the Highlands context. Geertz (1963, p 119) maintained 
that primordial alliances and oppositions were static, as they had been crystallised 
over centuries. In the Highlands, however, alliances are rather fluid, shifting in 
nature as they are created through militarr alliances, intermarriage and ceremonial 
exchanges. Ketan (2004, pp 255-261) calls these inter-group relations, which 
develop over the years with the primary purpose of being used during elections, 
'the Hagen mega-cycle' 21 . What is important for the purpose of the analysis of 
primordial attachments is the extent of group solidarity and subjective aspects of a 
group-related feeling of identity. 
20 Wantok means 'one talk', the Tokpisisn world for people who speak the same language 
(Standish, 1994, p 60). 
21 Joseph Ketan, a Papua New Guinean anthropologist, has done his research in the Mount Hagen 
area in Western Highlands Province, hence the name of Hagen mega-cycle. 
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Local issues and identities have a primacy in Highlands politics. Group members 
take great pride in nominating one of their members as a candidate (Standish, 
2007, p 141). According to Ketan (2004, p 130), the 'name-must-not-go-down' 
principle is of supreme importance in the composition, solidarity and continuity of 
Hagen groups. The significance of primordial factors is manifested through 
localised support for elections as mobilization is usually organised in the name of 
the group. The ideology of group solidarity is often expressed through bloc voting 
as an indicator of the 'corporate feeling of oneness' (Geertz, 1963, p 120) and also 
the often jealous protection of a candidate's base vote area. 
Clans often deliver their votes en bloc in order to secure the candidacy of their big 
men (Standish, 1989, p 165), consequently enhancing their group's prestigious 
standing vis-a-vis other clans. Such corporate activity reflects the desire for 
relative group worth as argued by both Geertz (1963) and Horowitz (2000). 
Standish (2002, online) observed that during the 2002 national elections Chimbu 
people had presented over 90 per cent voting solidarity at ballot boxes22. One 
way of expressing group solidarity is call~ng out the candidate's name loudly. 
This way, voters prove their loyalty to the group by demonstrating that they vote 
according to the tribal deal ('Pigs and Politics', 2002; Gibbs, 2004, p 11). Another 
method of clan voting is known as 'turning the table' 23 , which means that the 
22 This figure, however, does not necessarily reflect the genuine strength of clan solidarity as 
candidates often resort to coercive practices to secure their votes. This will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
23 InEnga, turning th,e table has acquired the name 'tanim tebol', a Tokpisin expression, which 
means that all votes go one way (AusAID, 2003b, p 21). 
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table, in fact, is turned over and all ballot papers are filled out for one candidate 
by his representative(s)24 (A.usAID, 2003b, p 21). 
According to an AusAID (2003b, p 21) report, "detailed statements of facts" have 
emerged that during the 2002 national elections officials were often coerced into 
allowing the mass-marking of ballot papers. In WHP, for example, a presiding 
officer was forced by armed supporters of a candidate to drive to a secluded area 
where he was ordered to sign the ballot papers (Post-Courier, 21 June 2002, p 1). 
Although the hijacking of ballot papers and the intimidation of polling officials 
are violence against the state, they reflect the desperate desire of the group to 
enhance the chance for their candidate to win, as his election to parliament gives a 
superior status to the group. Violence in this sense can be interpreted as a means 
to achieve positive social identity (Horowitz, 2000). 
There are occasions, however, when presiding officers readily approve the 
tampered ballot papers as authentic, as it was the case for one of the candidates in 
Sinasina-Yonggamugl Open seat25 (Chimbu province) (ABC TV, 'Foreign 
Correspondent', 2002): 
" .... Okay ... You guys relax and do your work. 
We are trying to send somebody to the National Parliament. .. 
Yes, Sir. 
However you do it. . .it doesn't matter. Just do it! 
Thank you very much! Thank you, Boss." 
24 This was the case in Enga for the provincial election. The son of Peter Ipatas (sitting Governor) 
was mass-marking ballot papers in front of the camera ('Tanim', 2003). 
25 This conversation was recorded by human rights activist, Robyn Slarke, while supporters of 
Peter Iggy Kalale were mass-marking ballot papers with the encouragement of the presiding 
officer. Peter' Iggy Kalale lost the election. 
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The mass-marking of ballot papers with the approval of the presiding officer 
occurs pmticularly when the official is a member of the clan. Such official 
behaviour reinforces Geertz's (1963) claim that kinship affiliations in 
modernising societies have primacy over the state. 
Another aspect of primordialism expressed by block voting practices relates to the 
issue of territoriality, which has a psychological underpinning. To defend the 
group's territory from enemies means to defend the collective identity. In the 
Highlands, supporters and candidates are jealous and highly protective of their 
base-vote area from other candidates. In 2002, it was almost impossible and also 
dangerous for candidates to campaign in their rivals' base areas (Standish, 2002, 
online; 'Pigs and Politics', 2002). Groups set up roadblocks in an effort to prevent 
rival groups from poaching votes in their territory. Supporters of rival candidates 
often resort to fighting at roadblocks resulting in injuries, destruction of property, 
vehicles in particular, or occasionally destruction of lives. In SHP, one of the 
candidates, Peter O'Neill, and his supporters, numbering about 1,000, were 
attacked and stoned by about 300 supporters of a rival candidate. The attack 
resulted in 25 injuries and two vehicles being badly damaged (National, 11 June 
2002, p 7). 
Another form of deterrent tactic employed by traditional tribal enemies to protect 
their base-votes is the kidnapping of a rival candidate (Dinnen, 2001, p 162; 
Ketan, 2004, p 250). In 2002, such a hostage-taking saga was reported in Koroba-
Lake Kopiago district (SHP) during the campaign period. Ben Peri, a Duna 
candidate, attempted to campaign with a police escort in the HuH-speaking 
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Koroba District, which was the base area of his rival, Herowa Agiwa26. During his 
campaign a gunfight broke out, one policeman was killed and two others injured. 
Ben Peri and another two policemen were taken hostage (Post-Courier, 20 May 
2002, p 1); A few days after the kidnapping took place, the former sitting member 
of Koroba district, Herowa Agiwa, admitted that some of those holding the three 
hostages were his supporters (Post-Courier, 22 May 2002, p 1). Allegedly, it was 
Mr Agiwa who had arranged the hostage-taking (Haley, 2004, p 19). 
The primordial approach assumes in-group cooperation and out-group hostility 
(Conteh-Morgan, 2004, p 199). In the Highlands, however, this dichotomy does 
not always hold strong. In keeping with the fluidity and shifting allegiances of 
Melanesian politics27 , violence occurs not only between groups, but within groups 
as well. Standish (2007, p 141) argues that in the last decade group unity has been 
breaking down as more and more candidates stand, consequently splitting the tribe 
or even the clan base vote. Such splits contribute to serious fighting. In 2002, the 
polling for the Sambeoko clan at Par, where two candidates contested the 
Kombiam I Amburn Open seat (Enga), e~ded in the death of two men and a tribal 
fight that lasted four months after the elections claiming another 16 lives 
('Tanim', 2003; Lakane & Gibbs, 2003, p 109; Gibbs, 2004, p 6). A similar 
incident occurred in Kundiawa (Chimbu) where a fight erupted between 
26 Koroba-Lake Kopiago district is the home of four different ethnic groups, the Huli, the Duna, 
the Rewa and the Bogaia. The Koroba seat has been held by a Huli since 1982. Koroba, which is 
the Huli part of the district has always been more developed than Lake-Kopiago, the Duna 
speaking area. Disparities between different parts of the district are a source of discontent and 
explain the long-standing tension between the Duna and the Huli (Haley, 2004, p 16-17). 
27 As previously noted in this chapter (p 31), Highlands groups are fluid and shifting in nature. 
They are characterised.as much by unity as by factionalism, which has always been part of 
traditional Melanesian politics. Tribes, and sometimes clans, form alliances, which are temporary 
and ad hoc. Groups within the alliance often co-operate in the drive to attain a specific goal. Whilst 
such co-operation bring along high level of unity within and between groups, group unity can be 
threatened by disruptive power struggles that exist between leaders of different factions (Ketan, 
2004, p 108). 
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supporters of two candidates, both from the Kamanegu tribe. Many people had 
been killed and many had b~come refugees as the result of the conflict, which was 
still under way weeks after the elections (Dika, 2003, p 44-45). Modernisation in 
post-colonial societies strengthens primordial attachments, but at the same time it 
also has the potential for breaking down 'the corporate feeling of oneness'. 
The importance of group identity, a sense of common solidarity and the 
attachment to a specific territory reinforce the prevalence and endurance of 
primordial attachments in post-colonial Highlands societies as argued by Geertz 
(1963). Similarly, effmts made to maximise votes are indicators of the group's 
desire to attain positive social identity as promoted by Horowitz (2000). However, 
political competition to gain access to the modem state also implies that conflict 
revolves arou~d the desired components of modernity as much as they revolve 
around identity. Geertz's application of primordial attachments to post-colonial 
states draws no attention either to the material expectations of groups or to the 
role of elites28 in the mobilization and manipulation of collective identities. These 
issues, which play an equally prominent r~le in the electoral context, provide the 
starting point of modernisation theory. 
Clan mobilization of candidates, rather than party loyalties or policies, has been 
widely documented as one of the most established features of electoral strategies 
in the Highlands (Saffu, 1996; Standish, 1996; Dinnen, 2001; Morgan, 2005). The 
primary preoccupation of candidates during electioneering is to secure votes from 
28 The term elite must be used fairly loosely in PNG, where leadership status is relatively 
permeable fo'r men of ambition (Claxton, 2000, p 267). 
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their natal clan, in-laws and matrikin29• The importance of kin ties as the basis for 
the mobilization of electoral support as expressed by one of the candidates during 
the 2002 elections ('Pigs and politics', 2002): 
"Up in the Highlands, we live in the tribal system- once your tribe is with 
you, that's it. It's not your political party or whatever. So that grouping 
that came across was not from my tribe, it's a different tribe. They got 
different blood. They have got their own candidate standing .... " 
(Peter Waieng, sitting member for Kundiawa) 
Bates (1983, p 161) argued that in the competition for power and prestige, elites 
stimulate the formation of ethnic groups. The politics of patronage through 
distributive activities, called 'Big Man politics' ('Pigs and Politics', 2002) reflects 
Bates's argument. Distributive activities are the primary means for candidates to 
mobilise and secure their local base. Such activities involve providing access to 
state resources in the form of development funds, commonly known as 'slush-
funds', projects as well as employment, education and travel to one's kin group 
(Morgan, 2005, p 4). 
These' distributive activities are part of the Melanesian tradition, which greatly 
influenced the ideology of contemporary politics. Despite the fact that patronage 
politics is played out with resources of the modern state, it is not a modern 
phenomenon. It has its origin in traditional Highlands societies. Traditional 
societies were predominantly redistributive societies governed by the principle of 
reciprocity (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 156). Reciprocity is deeply embedded in 
Highlanders' cultural mores; a gift incurs an obligation to be repaid at a later 
29 This observation was made by Standish (2002, online) in Chimbu province for candidates who 
campaigned for Open seats during the 2002 elections. 
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stage, simultaneously it opens a continuing exchange relationship (Standish, 1983, 
p 108). 
As Dinnen points out (2001, p 175), electoral strategies employed by 
contemporary politicians bear similarities to those of Melanesian Big Men. Just as 
traditional big men secured popular approval of their power by establishing their 
monopoly over redistributive resources (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985, p 157), in 
contemporary societies, politicians convert their representative roles into one of 
patronage as a means of building prestige and engendering social debts from the 
electors. 
As mentioned earlier, people often cast their votes along clan lines. While such 
corporate voting behaviour means a high level of group solidarity, it also indicates 
the groups' desire to gain the benefits of the modern state for their respective 
members. Whole clans promise their votes for one candidate, but in return for the 
votes delivered, elites are expected to distribute patronage in the form of schools, 
roads, electricity etc for their local power base ('Tanim', 2003). On the one hand, 
high material expectations of voters reinforce Bates's theory, which argued that 
groups placed considerable social pressure on their elites (Bates, 1983, p 162). On 
the other hand, they run counter to Horowitz's criticism (2000, p 104) of the 
assumption that non-elites follow if there is a pay-off. 
Additionally, Bates (1983, p 162-163) argued that groups have the capacity to 
withdraw their elites' status if they fail to satisfy their demand for material 
resources. The high expectations from contemporary leaders, which again are 
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similar to those held by traditional big men (Dinnen, 2001, p 174), is reflected by 
the high turnover rate of M~mbers of Parliament (MPs). MPs. who do not deliver 
goods and services to their 'constituency' are not getting re-elected (R~illy, 
2002b, p 25; Dorney, 2002, p 117-119)30• The high turnover of MPs substantiates 
Bates's argument about social pressure placed on elites. Moreover, it indicates 
that people follow their leaders if there is a pay-off, or to be more precise, they do 
not follow if there is no pay-off, hence the validity of modernisation theory as 
opposed to Horowitz' criticism of it. 
Although Bates (1983, p 161) argued that "the main reason for conflicts is that in 
the competition for power, ethnic appeals are useful to politicians", he did not 
attribute conflicts solely to the aspiration of elites, but also to communal 
aspiration for the components of modernity (Bates, 1983, p 153). Communal 
aspiration is to be understood against the backdrop of social mobilization. Having 
been mobilized into the modem economy and polity, groups came to desire the 
benefits generated. They want to have more goods, more recognition and more 
power (Melson & Wolpe, 1971, p 5). Ho'Yever, the valued goods represented by 
" 
modernity are scarce in proportion to the demand for them. The imbalance 
between demands and supply inevitably results in competition (Melson & Wolpe, 
1971, p 6; Bates, 1983, p 153). 
Political competition in the Highlands is intense as membership in Parliament 
provides access to sectoral allowances and funds. Although these funds are made 
30 At each election over half the parliamentary members lose their seats. For example, during the 
1997 election, only 55 incumbent politicians were able to retain their seats (May, 2002, p 13). In 
2002, the number ofMPs losing a seat reached its peak, the figure totalled an extraordinary 83 of 
106 (Standish, 2003, p 146). 
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available for politicians for direct distribution in their electorates, in reality, they 
only serve two purposes. Or1 the one hand, they are used for self-advancement. On 
the other hand, they are often politicised to shore up political support, to reward 
followers, and to secure votes for re-election (Dinnen, 1996, p 83; Stewart & 
Strathern, 2002, p 79). As a consequence, political competition is being reduced to 
a zero-sum game as only the politician and his local base enjoy the benefits of 
modernity. The remaining part of the electorate, however, has equal demand for 
goods and services, hence the fractionalisation between groups within the same 
electorate (Strathern, 1993a, p 46). The source of the conflict lies in the imbalance 
in the distribution of goods and services, which is the consequence of elites' 
ambition for power. 
The imbalance in the distribution of modernity is a source of jealousy, frustration 
and anger for the remaining part of their electorates. Those who are left out may 
perceive themselves as being treated like "enemies" (Stewart & Strathern, 2002, p 
79). During the 2002 elections, member of the Anglimp I South Waghi electorate 
(WHP), Kuk Kuli, was attacked by Minj people. It is alleged that Mr Kuli was 
c 
attacked because he had only provided services for his own supporters, neglecting 
the rest of the district (Post-Courier, 16 April2002, p 1)31 . A few days later, Mr 
Kuli's supporters retaliated (Post-courier, 18 April 2002, p 2). Their attack 
indicates that the Minj people, in fact, were considered as enemy. 
With respect to elite ambitions for power, Bates's theory explains that elites 
mobilise support of their ethnic groups. Bates, however, did not make any 
31 MP Kuk Kuli later.resigned in order to avoid tribunal charges for misappropriating Kl75,540 
that belonged to the National Gaming Board (Post-Courier, 30 April 2002, p 2). 
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reference to the possibility that in the quest for power and prestige, the elite may 
or can resort to violence against its members, as was the case in the Highlands. 
Patronage politics discussed earlier is not the only strategy for soliciting electoral 
support. In their competition for "super-big-man status" (Ketan, 2004, p 244), 
many candidates resort to vote-buying practices, which can trigger retaliation, as 
well as to intimidation of voters. In these cases, violence is the product of elite 
ambitions directed at members of the group. 
The "commoditization of voting process" (Strathern, 1993a, p 48) by giving out 
cash directly to the people became a widely used practice in all Highlands 
provinces during the 2002 elections32. Desperate candidates were prepared to go 
to the polling stations with hard cash in their hands to entice voters (Independent, 
13 June 2002, p 2). It seemed that candidates were pursuing voters, rather than the 
reverse (Post-Cou,rier, 19 June 2002, p 11). 
Cash-for-votes also have its origins in traditional practices and it is also based on 
the principle of reciprocity. Whereas in tr~ditional societies big men tried to outdo 
each other with the size of their pigs and gifts, in contemporary societies 
candidates try to outdo each other with cash in election campaigns (Ketan, 2004, p 
244). Candidates "invest or gamble" (Post-Courier, 6 June 2002, p 5) a huge 
amount of money during campaigning in the hope that their 'generosity' will be 
reciprocated with votes. Practice, however, deviates from ideology, as individuals 
do not always support those candidates who have given out cash. The imbalance 
in reciprocity, when cash is not reciprocated with votes, contributes to various 
32 
'Vote-buying' is not a new phenomenon. Standish documented the practice of "doing a little bit 
of bribery around anq about" during the 1977 national elections in Chimbu province ( 1983, p 108-
109). . 
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forms of retribution such as murder, rape, injury to person and destruction of 
property by disgruntled and losing candidates and their supporters after polling 
(Ketan, 2004, p 246). 
Another consequence of large sums of money distributed during campaigning is 
that some candidates seek to enforce the solidarity of their clan people. While 
group voting is a characteristic electoral behaviour in the Highlands, to measure 
the extent to which voting in solidarity is genuine seems to be difficult in an 
environment where voters are intimidated at gunpoint and coerced to vote 
according to 'the right way' (Standish, 1996, p 299-300). According to Singirok33 
(2005, p 2), during the 2002 elections both candidates and incumbents were 
prepared to use firearms as a means to harass, intimidate and threaten voters in 
order to secure their votes. Such electoral behaviour of candidates in the 
Highlands, especially in SHP, Enga and WHP, has resulted in what some call as 
"Afghanistan-type" elections (Post-Courier, 26 July 2002, pp 1-2) and also has 
contributed to the emergence of 'warlordism' (National, 2 July 2002, p 9; 'Foreign 
Correspondent', 2002). 
In the electoral context, it is the combination of the two theoretical approaches 
that best explains inter-group conflicts in the Highlands. Whereas Geertz's 
argument about primordial attachment within the modernising state is useful in 
highlighting the importance of collective identity, Bates's theory provides 
powerful explanations as to why and how political competition can contribute to 
conflict between groups in the Highlands region. Additionally, it can be argued 
33 Jerry Singirok is a .retired Major-General and former commander of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force. 
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that Horowitz's criticism (2000, pp 102-103) of modernisation theories falls short. 
Bates did not explain conflict from an elitist perspective, but rather from the 
mixture of elite ambitions to power and communal desire to gain access to the 
benefits of the modern state. It is exactly this desire to extract goods and services 
from the state that partly explains election-related violence in the Highlands, 
which is one of the least developed regions in the world. Nonetheless, there are 
areas of election-related violence that neither of the theories can fully explain due 
to their strong focus on inter-group relations. 
This chapter has demonstrated that sociological theories, primordialism and 
modernisation theory, have their strengths and shortcomings in explaining 
election-related violence in the Highlands societies. Conflicts in the Highlands 
region exhibit a number of features. They can be driven by sentiments or I and 
material expectations, but they can also be the outcome of institutional 
constraints. A comprehensive examination of election-related violence, therefore, 
requires the incorporation of the capacity of the state into the analysis. 
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Chapter three: An examination of the political aspects of violence 
Societies divided along ethnic cleavages tend to produce party systems that 
exacerbate conflict (Horowitz, 2000, p 291). Horowitz (2000, p 306) argues that 
ethnic parties and ethnic party systems are the building blocks of party politics in 
ethnically divided societies. Ethnic parties mobilize their support from an 
identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group. Contrary to a broad 
based party system that aims to serve the public at large, ethnic parties only 
identify narrow group interest. In the competition for state power, ethnic groups 
seek to exclude other groups from power. Conflict results from the incompatibility 
of ethnic claims to power (Horowitz, 2000, pp 291-297). 
In contrast to Horowitz's claim, conflict in PNG, which is the most ethnically 
fragmented society in the world (Reilly, 2000, p 163), does not result from the 
competition of ethnic groups for power. Ethnicity in PNG has not posed the 
divisive threat that it has in many developing countries. Although PNG' s ethnic 
divisions may be a source of local conflic~s, the extreme fragmentation of the 
country and the absence of any large ethnic group have meant that no ethnic or 
linguistic group is big enough to monopolise power at the national level (Reilly, 
2000, p 178, May, 2003b, p 163). Additionally, the apparent weakness of PNG's 
party politics reflects the difficulty that parties face in organising a strong support 
base to achieve political aims. 
These realities were demonstrated during the 2002 national elections. A week 
before the people of PNG went to the poll to cast their votes, Sir Mekere Morauta, 
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then Prime Minister, urged voters to choose candidates on their merits instead of 
their party affiliations (Nat~onal, 7 June 2002, p 5). Sir Mekere said "parties have 
no blood, eyes and nose, forget the parties but the people in the party" (Post-
Courier, 7 Jun~ 2002, p 4). Sir Mekere's statement indicates that political parties 
in PNG matter little as a factor in choosing qndidates. 
Party politics in PNG bears little relationship to the classic Westminster two-party 
model, which is believed to be the cornerstone of democracy (Powell, 1982, p 7). 
Politics in PNG is characterised by a diffuse and fragmented party system. Never 
in PNG's history was the party system as fragmented as it was in 2002, when a 
record-breaking 43 political parties registered for the national elections (National, 
1 May 2002, p 7). Among the 24 parties that won seats in the national legislature 
(PNGEC, 2006, online), 12 parties are now representing the Highlands region34. 
In addition to the high level of fragmentation of the party system, political parties 
in PNG are organisationally weak, lack a mass base and have no ideological 
affiliations35 (May, 2004, pp 136-137; Reilly, 2002a, p 706). Contrary to 
Horowitz's claim, parties in PNG do not function as representatives of a particular 
ethnic group36, but rather as "aggregative groupings" from which parliamentary 
coalitions are built (Reilly, 1999, p 231). Parliamentary coalitions are unstable 
owing to the inherent weakness of the PNG party system that up until 2002 
34 See Appendix A and Appendix B for parties. 
35 The lack of ideological differences among the parties was apparent during the 2002 election 
campaigns. They all emphasised general themes such as the importance of economic development, 
delivery of government services, especially health and education, to rural areas, good governance 
and an end to corruption. 
36 The three biggest parties, National Alliance, People's Democratic Movement and People's 
Progress Party, that won seats in the legislature (Appendix A) endorsed candidates from almost all 
provinces (PNGEC, 2006, online; Post-Courier, 1 August 2002). 
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allowed for frequent 'party-hopping' or 'yo-yo' politics for opportunistic purposes 
(May, 2002, p 7i7. The constant shifting of parliamentary loyalties was strongly 
associated with frequent motions of no-confidence. Since independence, every 
government has been a coalition government, and until 2002 no government had 
served its full term38 due to a no-confidence motion against residing governments. 
A problem associated with the frequent use of a no-confidence vote is that it 
renders political life an ultimately hollow and unproductive exercise. On the one 
hand, the frequent use of no-confidence motions resulted in long adjournments of 
parliament; an effective way to avoid a no-confidence vote. On the other hand, it 
has created an atmosphere in which Prime Ministers are predominantly 
preoccupied with the arduous task of holding the coalition together and keeping 
members on side. The 'wheeling and dealing' of coalition politics has taken its 
toll on good governance. Successive governments have been unable to maintain 
long-term national policies, which in tum have contributed to a decline in the 
state's capacity to serve the interest of its citizens (May, 2003b, pp 156-157, 164). 
Shortcomings in the political systein mirror the wider acknowledgement that PNG 
exhibits many of the signs of a weak state (Filer, 1992; Standish, 1994; Dinnen, 
2001; Reilly, 2002a; May, 2003a; Morris & Stewart, 2005). Since independence, 
the state has lacked the capacity to deliver its policies and services to its citizens 
and has failed to maintain popular acceptance. As a consequence, the state now 
37 Sir Mekere Mora uta initiated the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates (OLIPPAC). The purpose of the constitutional reform was "to develop and nurture a 
political culture in which intrinsic values of constitutional democracy are re&pected and maintained 
through strengthening political parties and stabilising the executive" (Baker, 2005, p 102). The 
law, which came into effect in 2002, incorporated provisions prohibiting party-hopping. 
38 The current Somar~ government will be the first to complete a full five-year term. See Appendix 
C for coalition governments since 1972. 
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lacks authority over society and maintains a low level of political legitimacy. 
Dinnen (200 1, p ~ 78) argues that the limited institutional capacity and legitimacy 
of the state are deeply implicated in the growth of election-related violence. In the 
absence of strong parties that would have the capacity to mobilize followers into 
conflict, it seems to be more appropriate to examine the relationship between 
election-related violence and the weak capacity of PNG's state. 
Robert Rotberg, a prominent political scientist, recently produced a book to 
examine how and why states decay and what can be done to prevent them from 
collapsing. Rotberg (2003) categorises strong, weak, failing and collapsed nation-
states according to political, social and economic criteria. Rotberg (2003, pp 2-4) 
argues that it is the ability to deliver political goods to citizens that distinguishes 
strong states from weak states, and weak states from failed states. Political goods 
are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that provide the basis of social 
contract between people and the state. This social contract is at the core of state-
society interactions. According to Rotberg (2003, p 3), there is a hierarchy of 
political goods. At the top of the hierarchy is the supply of human security, 
followed by the opportunity to participate freely in the political process and the 
availability of various social services. 
The implications for the state's ability to deliver the above mentioned political 
goods for stability is real. Rotberg (2003, p 4) argues that strong states, which 
perform well across all categories, are "places of enviable peace and order". In 
contrast, weak states that show a mixed profile in their ability to provide the 
essential political goods usually harbour intergroup tensions. Failed states, in 
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which political goods are nearly non-existent, are to a large extent riddled with 
ongoing conflicts (Rotbergl 2003, pp 4-9). Although Rotberg acknowledges the 
relationship between the ability to provide political goods and political stability, 
he does not explain how the lack of the former contributes to conflict. By using 
Rotberg's hierarchy of political goods as a model, the aim of this chapter is to 
examine how the weakness of the 'bits of the state' (Filer, 1992, p 118), including 
the security forces, the Electoral Commission and provincial governments, 
i 
contribute to election-related violence. 
Rotberg argues that the most important component of political goods is human 
security. According to political theory, the state is irreplaceable in guaranteeing 
this security (Lambach, 2006, p 408). The most fundamental function of the state 
is to provide a secure environment for its citizens. In order to provide human 
security, a nation-state needs to protect its sovereignty from outside intervention, 
ensure a secure domestic climate free from attacks on the state's social structure 
and the national order, to prevent crime, and to allow for its citizens to settle their 
disputes, whether it be with the state or with fellow citizens, without resorting to 
armed violence or other forms of physical coercion (Rotberg, 2003, p 3). 
Whilst external factors do not pose a potential threat to PNG's security39 due to 
the country's relatively benign security environment, conflicts within the country 
have greatly compromised stability. Elections, especially in the Highlands, are 
39 Although problems have arisen in the past in three main areas: the border with Indonesia, the 
border with Solomon Islands and border violations by non-state actors (May, 2006a, p 155). 
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one of many dimensions ofPNG's insecure domestic climate40, which provide a 
good illustration of the state's inability to ensure the security of its citizens. In all 
five Highlands provinces, the 2002 elections were characterised by the complete 
breakdown of law and order. Two factors in particular stand out, the state's failure 
to prevent the frequent use of illicit firearms by candidates and their supporters 
and tht;lack of effective security operations, which undermined the safety of 
many highlanders. 
The 2002 elections in the Highlands claimed a number of lives in all provinces. In 
the Western Highlands, two men were killed in clashes between supporters, with 
dozens reported seriously injured (Post-Courier, 19 June 2002, pp 1-2). Two men 
were killed in the Eastern Highlands a few days after polling started (Post-
Courier, 24 June 2002, p 3). In Chimbu province a ten-year old girl was shot dead 
in a fight between supporters of two candidates at one of the polling stations 
(National, 25 June 2002, p 3). Another fight between supporters in Kundiawa 
Gembogl (Chimbu) electorate claimed the life of three men (Post-Courier, 2 July 
2002, p 3). Two men were reported kille~ in Enga on the 4th July (National, p 2). 
Just a week later a number of death in Enga rose to nine as election violence 
escalated between rival supporters (Independent, 11 July 2002, p 7). Four people 
were shot and chopped up in broad daylight in the Southern Highlands (Post-
Courier, 11 July 2002, p 3). Just a few days after polling started, the Post-Courier 
(2 July 2002, p 3) reported that the number of casualties in the Highlands had 
reached 13, with many more injured in election-related violence. Overall, it is 
estimated that approximately 100 people lost their lives in election-related warfare 
40 Other factors, such as tribal fighting, raskolism, gender violence and white-collar crime, also 
contribute to instability (Claxton, 2000, p 263; Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 2; May, 2006, p 
158). ' 
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in the Highlands (Standish, 2003, p 11), which is a clear indication of the absence 
of human security. 
As the examples show, most of the incidents involved firearms. The use of guns in 
clan warfare\started in 1985 with shotguns in the Western Highlands (Ketan, 
2004, p 181). The first firearm-related death in tribal fighting was reported in 
1987 in the Southern Highlands. Following the 1992 elections, politicians began 
to deliver high-powered, military-style rifles to their tribesmen (Alper, 2005, p 35; 
Standish, 1994, pp 57, 65). According to Singirok, the strength of tribes today is 
measured by the number of weapons they have (Post-Courier, 12 September 
2002, p 11). By supplying guns during clan warfare, politicians fulfil their 
obligations towards their wantoks, who, as ordinary citizens, cannot afford to pay 
the high costs of weapons and ammunitions. At the same time, "guns buy votes" 
(Strathern, 1993a, p 47). By supporting their kin group, politicians not only gain 
status, but also solicit political support. 
In the 2002 elections in the Highlands, members of the political elite were deeply 
implicated in the supply of illicit guns. Sir Mekere Morauta said "it was an open 
secret" that guns were freely smuggled by politicians (Post-Courier, 24 May 
2002, p 2). He also admitted that members of his own People's Democratic Party 
were involved in smuggling operations (Dinnen & Thompson, 2004, p 10). 
Reports from the Highlands revealed that during the 2002 elections "leaders in 
high places" purchased a lot of high-powered weapons and circulated them to 
their supporters and tribesmen (Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 2). It was also 
recognised that politicians themselves stockpiled a range of firearms including 
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AK47s, M16, M202, SLR and .303s to "keep a look out on individuals and 
supporters of other candidates" (Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 3). 
The use of illegal firearms to threaten, intimidate and even kill people by 
candidates and their supporting tribes and clans means that national security had 
reached a critical point. The presence of illicit high-powered guns and the 
persistence of tribal warfare, which greatly intensifies during elections, are 
indicators of state weakness. As noted by Rotberg (2003, p 3), the prime task of 
the state is to ensure a secure environment for its citizens to live. To do that, the 
state must implement and enforce legislations that deter criminal behaviour. 
In PNG, many serious criminal cases are being acquitted for lack of proper 
prosecution and I or the assumed lack of evidence. Whilst PNG has legislation for 
the control of firearms (the Firearms Act 1988), this legislation is hardly ever 
enforced. The conviction rate for firearm offences and related crimes is too low, 
and penalties are often too lenient. Additionally, crimes by leaders and electoral 
candidates are often condoned by state authorities (PNG Guns Control 
Committee, 2005, pp 4, 27; Singirok, 2005, p 9). 
Unless the state takes appropriate measures to effectively penalise indictable 
offences, there is a great danger that violence during elections will further 
intensify. Given the high incentives for winning an election, especially in the 
Highlands, and the low likelihood of prosecution for illegal behaviour, candidates 
will continue to use a variety of means, often illegal, to win. Hence the 
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transformation of big-men syndrome into warlord syndrome (PNG Guns Control 
Committee, 2005, p 22). 
Section 197 of the Constitution (PNG, 2006, online) states that "The primary 
functions of the Police Force are, in accordance with the Constitutional Laws and 
Acts of the Parliament- (a) to preserve peace and good order in the country; and 
(b) to maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective 
manner." Accordingly, to protect the voters and ensure they exercise their 
constitutional rights free of any form of interference is the responsibility of the 
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), the official name of the 
national police. Despite intentions to deal "swiftly and assertively" with those 
who resort to .unlawful and violent tactics during the elections (Post-Courier, 24 
April2002, p 5), in many cases the police were unable to prevent widespread 
intimidation, fraud and violence in the Highlands. 
The Electoral Commission (PNGEC) (2003, p 79) reported that police security at 
polling booths was insufficient, occasion~lly non-existent. Standish (2003, p 143) 
argues that ideally there should have been at least six police at each polling place 
in the Highlands41 . The fact that many polling booths were operating without 
police presence meant that in many instances both voters and polling officials 
were left at the mercy of candidates and their supporters, many of whom 
controlled and took the law into their hands. 
41 Some senior officers believed that squads of 20 well-armed men would have been needed to 
provide adequate security (AusAID, 2003b, p 18). 
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Despite rapid population growth, the police force, which currently has 
approximately 5,000 sworn officers, has not grown significantly over the last 30 
years (Dinnen, McLeod & Peake, 2006, p 89). At the 2000 Census, PNG had a 
population of 5.2 million people (May, 2006a, p 152r This means that the ratio of 
police to population was 1:1040, which fell far below of the UN recommendation, 
which is 1:450 (Human Rights Watch, 2007, online). Although there are no 
official figures of the number of policemen posted to the Highlands, given the 
Highlands population, which according to the 2002 Census was nearly 2 million 
(Post-Courier, 2 August 2002, p 11), it is apparent that police were overextended 
by the need to secure many polling places at the same time. In fact, election-
related deaths, violence and tension prompted the Police Commissioner, Joseph 
Kupo, to call for assistance from the Defence Force (PNGDF) to boost police 
manpower (Independent, 11 July 2002, p 6). 
Major shortages of funding also impeded election security operations. Initially, 
the police budget was K25 million, which was then cut back to K19 million. 
Eventually, however, the funds made available for the police were only KlO 
million (AusAID, 2003b, p 16). Although the police had its own separate budget, 
due to shortages, some K4 million originally allocated to the PNGEC was 
transferred by the national government to fund the Defence Force role (Post-
Courier, 11 June 2002, p 1). There were also administrative shortcomings that 
further worsened police operations. Chimbu police, for example, withdrew 
security at the counting centre in protest over non-payment of polling allowances 
(Post-Courier, 18 July 2002, p 4). Similarly, the Western Highlands plunged into 
chaos when frustrated policeman forced all counting in the province to a 
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standstill, as they did not receive their allowances (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p 
1). 
Whilst shortage of officials, funding and administrative problems contributed to a 
large extent as to why the police were unable to effectively perform their official 
duties during the elections, some elements of the security forces voluntarily chose 
not to be effective and not to protect the voters and the electoral process. Because 
of their partisanship and undisciplined behaviour during the 1997 elections, 
soldiers were confined to barracks during the 2002 elections {May, 2003b, p 160). 
Despite this, 12 serving soldiers and a number of dishonourably discharged 
soldiers, without permission from their commander, were seen assisting election 
candidates in the Highlands (Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 1). In WHP there were 
allegations that factions of the police force were allied either with Paias Wingti or 
with his direct rival Fr Robert Lak42 (Standish, 2003, p 138). There were also 
accusations in the media of the police taking political sides in SHP and Enga 
(Post-Courier, 4 July 2002, p 3). Thus the presence of security forces, including 
both the police and the PNGDF, has been. a controversial issue. 
The next political good on Rotberg's hierarchy is the opportunity for citizens to 
freely, openly and fully participate in the political process of the state (Rotberg, 
2003, p.3). This political good provides the basis of the legitimacy of the state 
(Patrick, 2006, p 29). To enable all eligible citizens the opportunity to play an 
active part in politics the state must meet two important conditions, an electoral 
roll of high integrity and an environment in which voters can cast their votes 
42 Fr Rober Lak was the Provincial Member and Governor, who had defeated Wingti in 1997. Lak 
lost to Wingti during the 2002 elections (Standish, 2003, p 138; PNGEC, 2006, online). 
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without a sense of fear of intimidation (Commonwealth, 2002, p 11; 0' Grady et 
al, 2007, online). The fact that during the 2002 elections in PNG neither of these 
conditions was met illustrates the weak capacities of the state. 
Despite section 50 of the Constitution, which regulates that "every citizen who is 
of full capacity and has reached voting age ... has the right and shall be given the 
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to vote for elective 
public office at genuine, periodic, free elections" (PNG, 2006, online), many 
citizens of PNG were deprived of their basic human rights. Significant electoral 
maladministration and considerable security problems contributed to a large 
extent to the state's failure to satisfactorily conduct the 2002 national elections 
and also added significantly to tensions and the potential for conflict. 
One major underlying problem was the difficulty of providing an accurate voter 
registration. In April 2002, the absence of an updated preliminary electoral roll for 
public examination prompted Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta to seek an 
interim court injunction to stop the issuing of writs (Post-Courier, 4 April 2002, p 
1). The National Court, however, ruled that Sir Mekere's application was 
inconclusive and flawed with abnormalities and irregularities, therefore the notice 
of motion was incompetent. Justice Mark Sevua argued "The State cannot 
complain about the state of the Common Roll when, on the evidence of the Chief 
Electoral Commissioner, it (State) failed to allocate sufficient funding to update 
the Common Roll"(Post-Courier, 8 April 2002, p 1). 
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In fact, the major factor that impeded the Electoral Commission (PNGEC) to 
produce an updated roll was the state's failure to disburse the necessary funds in 
time. It was not until January 2002 that the PNGEC obtained the funds from the 
state (Standish, 2003, p 135), consequently the exercise of correcting the largely 
inaccurate 1997 roll started late43 and could not be completed in a timely manner. 
When voting began in June 2002 it became apparent that the update of the roll, or 
the lack thereof, caused considerable problems nationwide with many names of 
voters either in the wrong electorates and wards or left out (Post-Courier, 5 June 
2002, p 1) 44. From 1992, peoples' names have to be on the roll in order for them 
to vote45 • The Electoral Commission failed to process over a million claims for 
enrolment before the rolls were printed (Standish, 2003, p 135), which possibly 
meant that over a million people were prevented to cast their votes. 
The failure to record many new names on the rolls is in sharp contrast with the 
Highlands experience. In the Highlands, in all five provinces, the electoral roll 
contained an enormously inflated number of electors (Standish, 2003, p 135). As a 
result, all provinces have recorded a vote .more than 150% of the indicative census 
figure for eligible electors. In the case of Chimbu province, for example, the vote 
figure was as high as 285%46. Additionally, the number of votes cast in the 
Highlands provinces increased an average of 75.73% from the 1997 election47 , 
43 Following the 1997 national elections, the Parliament passed a motion for the PNGEC to use the 
1997 National Election Common Roll for the 2002 elections (Post-Courier, 28 March 2002, p 22). 
44 Mostly in Port Moresby, Bougainville, Lae and in some urban areas (Post-Courier, 2 August 
2002, p 11). . 
45 In 1992, an amendment to the Organic Law on National Elections abolished 'Section 141' 
voting. Before 1991, people, whose names did not appear on the roll, were allowed to vote if they 
£rovided legal age and residential requirements (Dinnen, 2001, p 152). 
6 See Appef1dix D for the analysis of the 2002 Census and Common Roll by province. 
47 See Appendix E for the comparison of 1997 and 2002 vote in four Highlands provinces. 
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despite an average population growth rate of around 2.5% (May, 2006a, p 152)48 . 
This alarming increase demonstrates the escalation of electoral fraud in the form 
of multiple voting that was occurring in the Highlands. 
In addition to the delay in funding to update the roll, funding for running the 
election was also reportedly provided late (AusAID, 2003b, p 23). Election 
managers expressed their concerns about the lack of financial capacity to transport 
ballot boxes to the districts (Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p 1). As a consequence, 
in many Highlands' electorates polling started late. Polling in both Enga and SHP, 
for example, was scheduled for the 251h of June (National, 4 June 2002, p 8). 
While polling in Enga did not start until the 28th of June (National, 28 June 2002, 
p 3), in SHP, it was delayed until the 051h of July (Post-Courier, 5 July 2002, p 2). 
These changes in polling schedules resulted in the disenfranchisement of some 
electors as the PNGEC failed to provide adequate information about the new 
polling arrangements, consequently many people were absent at the time of actual 
polling (PNGEC, 2003, p 72). 
" 
Another factor that prevented many people to express their political will was the 
inadequate security of ballot boxes. Sometimes whole clans missed out on voting 
either because they never received ballot boxes as they had frequently been 
hijacked or because the ballot boxes containing their marked ballot papers were 
destroyed (Gibbs, 2004, pp 9-11). Several newspaper reports indicated that the 
police often watched helplessly and could do little about saving the ballot boxes. 
48 It is more likely that the population growth rate for the Highlands is higher than the national 
average given that Southern Highlands and Eastern Highlands provinces were reported to have a 
population growth rat~ of 3.6%. Also, Western Highlands' population grew by 2.7% between 1990 
and 2000 (National, 3 May, 2002, p 3). 
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Supporters of a candidate in Mount Hagen, for example, held up polling officials 
and policemen with firearms and walked off with numerous ballot boxes (Post-
Courier, 19 June 2002, p 2). Similarly, in SHP, supporters overpowered the police 
and removed all ballot boxes containing 30,000 marked ballot papers (Post-
Courier, 11 July 2002, p 3). In Enga province, 30 men armed with M-16s and 
Kalashnikovs raided the police station and dynamited one-third of the completed 
ballots. This time the police run away (Post-Courier, 12 July 2002, p 1; 'Pigs and 
Politics', 2002). 
The fact that many people were unable to cast their votes either because their 
names were omitted or left off the roll or due to delays in polling contributed to 
considerable frustration and anger from parts of many electorates. Similarly, the 
hijacking and destruction of ballot boxes, which robbed many electors of their 
constitutional and universal rights, again resulted in anger. As one of the villagers, 
interviewed after the Enga incident, said "Everyone's not really happy, they're 
very, very angry now for this incident" ('Pigs and Politics', 2002). It can be 
argued that the state's failure to provide t~e opportunity for its citizens to 
participate in the political process raised the level of tension. It can also be 
assumed that the inflation of the roll in the Highlands contributed to violence. 
Inflating the roll is intentional; it is organised by candidates to increase their share 
of the vote (AusAID, 2003b, p 12; Standish, 2007, p 144). While 'rigging' the 
system facilitated multiple voting, in the absence of adequate security, it may also 
. have provided the incentive to harass, intimidate and threaten voters to secure 
their votes and coerce polling officials to sign and to allow the mass-marking of 
all available ballot papers. 
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The last key political good on Rotberg's hierarchy relates to service delivery. The 
state is expected to supply essential goods and services to its citizenry. These 
include healthcare, education, physical and communicational infrastructure, and a 
beneficial fiscal environment in which citizens can pursue their economic interests 
(Rotberg, 2003, pp 3-4). Although section 2 (3) of the five 'National Goals and 
Directive Principles' included in the introduction to the Constitution (May, 2004, 
p 309) defines that "every effort to be made to achieve an equitable distribution of 
incomes and other benefits of development among individuals and throughout the 
various parts of the country" (PNG, 2006, online), many Papua New Guineans, 
especially those living in rural areas, are left without essential social services. 
The breakdown of basic service delivery in rural areas has been widely 
acknowledged (National Economic and Fiscal Commission, 2003; Gibson & 
Rozelle, 2003; Monis & Stewart, 2005; Manning, 2005). The Highlands is one of 
the poorest regions in the country49 with very poor infrastructure and poor access 
to health and educational services (Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, pp 165-167; World 
Bank, 2004, pp 14-17). In 2002, for example, Mendi High School (SHP) was 
closed because operational funds for the Provincial Education Office had not been 
received. Roads were in a tenible state of disrepair (Post-Courier, 10 May 2002, p 
11). In the WHP, a measles outbreak claimed 51 children's lives because the 
Mount Hagen General Hospital lacked the necessary drug supplies, including 
antibiotics and intravenous fluids (Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 19). Similarly, the 
Kundiawa General Hospital (Chimbu) was in a critical state, as desperately 
needed drug supplies did not reach the hospital (Post-Courier, 1 May 2002, p 6). 
49 The two most poverty-stricken regions in PNG are the Highlands and the Momase/North Coast 
region (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003, p 166). 
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Under the Organic Law, national functions such as defence and economic 
management are the respon_sibility of the National Government, while key areas of 
service delivery are the responsibility of provincial governments (Morris & 
Stewart, 2005, online). Provincial governments have been ineffective since the 
1980s50. However, since the 1995 reform, which replaced the previous Organic 
Law on Provincial Government with the Organic Law on Provincial and Local-
Level Governments (OLPLLG) (May, 2002, p 7), their capacities have 
deteriorated drastically (Standish, 2007, p 204). The ineffectiveness of provincial 
governments largely results from ill-organised and dysfunctional funding 
arrangements. The lack of transparency and accountability with regards to the 
allocation of funds has provided for entrenched corruption, which ultimately 
contributed to the further deterioration of service delivery and become debilitating 
to good governance. 
The nominal primary purpose of the OLPLLG was to further decentralise power 
to local level governments by abolishing elected provincial assemblies. In effect, 
the reform re-centralised power by giving more influence to national Members of 
Parliament (MP), especially the Provincial Governors, over the allocation of 
district operation funds for government services, as well as the Electoral 
Development Funds (known as 'slush funds') for discretionary allocation. 
Additionally, MPs also· have strong influence over staffing matters such as the 
appointment of senior officials (Standish, 2006, p 204). 
50 Until the 1995 reform some 14 provincial governments had been suspended mostly for financial 
mismanagement, but also for maladministration, nepotism and favouritism (Regan, 1997, pp 49-
51). ' 
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Between 1984 and 1999 MPs' discretionary funds grew from KlO,OOO to Kl.5 
million per annum. At the s_ame time, basic operating funds provided by the 
national government for provinces have considerably declined (Standish, 2006, pp 
204-205). Although provinces are lacking the means to deliver basic services, 
only a few MPs transfer their discretionary funds and other district support grants 
to local-level and provincial governments51 . Due to the fact that discretionary 
funds are largely unaccountable, and their use is not transparent (Standish, 2006, p 
205), MPs are more likely to spend their K1.5 million on rewarding themselves 
and their supporters rather than on much needed economic development projects 
in their electorates. Sir Peter Barter, Inter-Government Relation Manager, accused 
the administration of the Southern Highlands Province of being a kleptocracy -
rule by thieves for thieves. He argued that governors, acting governors and 
administrators (often appointed by politicians) used public money that should 
have gone into better roads, health centres and schools (Post-Courier, 21 October 
2002, p 1). 
Dinnen (2001, p 179) argues that the diminishing capacity of government services 
is directly linked to political patronage. The public knows about the discretionary 
funds and they have high expectations from their MPs. National parliamentarians 
readily redirect state resources to members of their 'constituency' in an effort to 
sustain their career. They use these funds to buy votes, to sponsor pork-barrel 
projects and to nurture other tit-for-tat relationships as a means to strengthen their 
local power base and enhance their chances for re-election (Dinnen, 2001, p 173; 
Okole, 2003, p 58). These distributive activities, which only benefit a small 
51 There are a few exceptions, such as East New Britain and North Solomons, where MPs do 
transfer their funds to' the districts (Standish, 2007, p 149; Okole, 2003, p 54). 
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minority, mean that for many highlanders the word development remains 
unknown as politicians hav.e greatly undermined the capacity of provincial 
governments by reducing the funds available for services. 
Standish (2006, p 204) argues that the weaker the provincial governments 
become, the more central the role of the MPs becomes, and the more intense and 
ultimately destructive the political competition for their position. These funds 
provide a real incentive for gaining political office, inspiring more and more 
candidates to stand. During the 2002 elections, more than 1000 candidates 
contested the 39 Highlands seats (Post-Courier, 16 April 2002, p 2). This intense 
political competition has further been facilitated by the first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral system52, which provided an opportunity for candidates to gain elections 
with a relatively small proportion of the overall vote53 • The low thresholds 
required for victory have to a large extent encouraged electoral violence (Reilly, 
2002c, p 250; Okole, 2002, p 37). In their pursuit of maximising votes, rival 
candidates readily resort to all sorts of illegal activities. Additionally, it can also 
be argued that the "growing primacy of p~litics" as a means of economic 
development (Dinnen, 2001, p 170) has also increased inter-tribal tensions and 
violence as those who are left out feel neglected and frustrated. 
By using Rotberg' hierarchy of political goods, human security, the opportunity to 
vote and service delivery, this chapter has attempted to answer how the weak 
52 In the 1964, 1968 and 1972 elections for the House of Assembly PNG used the optional 
preferential voting (OPV) system. FPTP, which was introduced into the constitution in 1975, was 
last used during the 2002 elections. Future elections, including the coming-up 2007 elections, will 
be conducted under the limited preferential voting (LPV) system (Reilly, 2002c, pp 239-252). 
53 In 2002, there was only one candidate who acquired more than a 50 per cent majority vote. In 
general, successful candidates won with a median of 16 per cent. However, some :MPs won with 
only 7 per cent of the votes from their constituency (Okole, 2002, p 37; Baker, 2005, p 100). 
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capacity of the PNG state provided for the continuing environment of election-
related violence in the Hig4lands region. The 2002 Highlands election is a 
testimony that the state lacks the ability to deliver all three political goods defined 
by Rotberg to its citizens, subsequently undermining the social contract between 
the people and the state. Unless appropriate measures are taken to strengthen the 
political institutions, elections will be marred by violence further eroding the 
legitimacy of the PNG state. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine how aspects of ethnic conflict theory 
and weak state theory are ~seful in explaining election-related violence in Papua 
New Guinea. The significance of this aim is to highlight that a comprehensive 
explanation of election-related violence necessitates an integrated multi-
disciplinary and multi-theoretical perspective. Election-related fighting is one 
dimension of internal conflict, which since the end of the Cold War has become a 
destabilising feature affecting many developing nations. Although attempts have 
been made to define what constitutes election-related violence, theoretical 
explanations of the phenomenon seem to be missing in the social sciences. 
Fighting that flares up around election times is a significant public order problem 
that requires attention and subsequently appropriate actions, especially in the light 
of the preoccupation of the Western world to assist developing nations to establish 
and consolidate well-functioning democratic states in an effort to create and 
maintain regional stability. Election-related violence has two serious implications 
forth~ health and viability of democracy. 'Firstly, it has a strong potential to erode 
the legitimacy of the state as it suggests that those in power, or at least some of 
them, are elected by the use of force rather than by the collective will of a 
constituency. Secondly, election-related violence, as a form of internal conflict, 
can pose a threat to the stability of already fragile nation-states by further 
destabilising internal security, which is an essential requirement for democracy. 
Election-related violence has not emerged in a vacuum. It is primarily the product 
of the constellation of historical, cultural, sociological and political factors. Thus, 
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it follows that election-related violence is a complex phenomenon that cannot be 
adequately analysed by a sipgle disciplinary or theoretical perspective. It requires 
a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary approach, which needs to be tailored to 
a specific country in question. 
The analytical focus of this thesis has centred on one specific country of the South 
Pacific, Papua New Guinea. The country, which is situated at Australia's 
doorstep, is among many developing nations experiencing political instability. 
This political instability partly results from ongoing fighting, which has 
intensified during election times. Election-related violence is especially disturbing 
in one particular region of PNG, the Highlands. Tribal fighting in the PNG 
Highlands is deeply rooted in historical and cultural practices. It was exactly these 
traditional customs, which have interacted with the process of democratisation to 
produce election-related violence. 
In an attempt to conceptualise election-related violence from a multi-theoretical 
perspective, this thesis applied ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory to the 
2002 elections in the Highlands region in order to analyse those sociological and 
political factors that exacerbate conflict. Owing to the unique social structure and 
traditional practices, ethnic conflict theory has been limited to the examination of 
primordialism and modernisation. The analytical focus of this thesis has been built 
on the meta-theories of Clifford Geertz, Robert H. Bates, Donald L. Horowitz and 
Robert I. Rotberg. While none aims to specifically address election-related 
violence, each of the meta-theories purports to explain different dimensions of 
inter-group conflict. Consequently, the arguments presented by these prominent 
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social scientists have considerable merit in terms of explaining election-related 
violence. But, at the same t~me, the analysis of the 2002 Highlands election also 
reveals some shortcomings of their explanatory power. An assessment of the 
usefulness of ethnic conflict theory and weak state theory is summarised next. 
The primordial approach proposed by Clifford Geertz has been a useful analytical 
tool in highlighting the importance and endurance of kinship affiliations in post-
colonial Highlands' societies. It has aiso been helpful to identify the psychological 
sources of conflict, which are motivated by the desire to achieve relative group 
worth. This is particularly relevant to PNG, especially in the Highlands, where 
collective identity and the prestigious status of groups have a primacy for many 
people. In the electoral context, group solidarity is manifested through block 
voting practices and the defence of a candidate's base vote area. These corporate 
activities serve to enhance the chance of a clan member to win elections. Groups 
enter into competition because having one's member elected in parliament gives a 
superior status to the group compared to other groups. 
However, the primordial approach has a number of shortcomings, consequently it 
lacks the capacity to adequately explain election-related violence. The emphasis 
given to primordial attachments implies in-group cooperation versus inter-group 
hostility. Yet, the analysis of the 2002 Highlands election revealed that group 
unity has been breaking down as fighting occurs not only between groups, but 
also within the group. Also, while primordialism captures the strength and non-
rational character of social ties, it pays no attention to the material expectations of 
groups and to the role of elites in the mobilization and manipulation of collective 
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identity, which play an equally important role in election-related violence. These 
deficiencies have been addressed by modernisation theorists, hence the 
importance of incorporating their argument into the analysis. 
In contrast to the primordial approach, modernisation theories seek to explain 
conflict according to a rational choice analysis. Modernisation theories have 
proven to be constructive in understanding election-related violence in material 
terms. It can be argued that Robert Bates's theory of political competition over the 
benefits generated by modernity is highly relevant in the Highlands. In accordance 
with Bates's argument, it is the aspiration of candidates either to retain or obtain 
power coupled with the aspiration of groups to gain access to various government 
funds, which results in conflict. In the competition for power, Highlands 
politicians use patronage politics played out with state resources as an instrument 
to mobilise support and gain re-election. The unequal distribution of goods and 
services is a source of anger and frustration, which inevitably leads to the 
fractionalisation between groups within the same electorate. 
Although Horowitz criticised modernisation theories for paying undue attention to 
elite ambitions, it can be argued that Bates's theory pays insufficient attention to 
the elite because it lacks the capacity to explain why, in the competition for 
power, elites even resort to violence against members of their own groups. In the 
Highlands, vote-buying practices are frequently employed by those with political 
aspirations. The large amount of money being invested in elections can trigger 
retaliation as well as the intimidation of voters. Similarly to primordialism, 
modernisation theory also falls short in explaining election-related violence. 
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Despite their limitations, the two aspects of ethnic conflict theory provide 
valuable insights into conflict motives. However, the apparent lack of consensus 
between the two approaches weakens their explanatory power. Whilst Bates 
contributed paramount importance to the material interpretation of conflict over 
Geertz's primordial approach, Horowitz favoured the realm of collective feeling 
over the realm of material interest. It is important to note that both principles are 
equally at work and they complement one another. The analysis of the 2002 
Highlands elections has revealed that election-related violence results not only 
from the desire to elevate the status of the group, but also from the rational pursuit 
of benefits. Therefore, a conclusion can be reached that each of the theories is 
insufficient in isolation. It is the combination of the two perspectives that provides 
a more inclusive rationalization of sociological aspects of election-related 
violence. 
The analysis of the 2002 Highlands elections highlights the role played· by 
institutional constraints in election-related violence. This follows that besides 
sociological factors, political aspects also .need to be considered when discussing 
c 
conflict. By incorporating ethnic party politics into his paradigm, it was Donald 
Horowitz, who came closest to assessing the role of the state in conflictual group 
relationships. In the case of PNG, where the party system is inherently weak and 
parties do not form around ethnic groups, Horowitz's argument does have 
shortcomings. For instance, PNG's party system points to the broader problem of 
weak state capacities, which is a significant reason behind election-related 
violence. 
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Robert Rotberg's three criteria for the effective functioning of nation-states, 
human security, the opportunity for political participation and social services, has 
been a valuable tool with which to examine how the weak capacities of the PNG 
state contribute to election-related violence. Although the state lacks the capacity 
to provide all three political goods, what has become apparent in the analysis is 
that it is primarily the lack of the most important political good, human security, 
which allows for increased violence. The high number of election-related 
casualties in the Highlands in 2002 is a testimony that the PNG state is unable to 
provide a secure environment for its citizens to live. Inadequate police presence 
and ineffective judicial arrangements provide for the continuing environment of 
conflict. These shortcomings of the state have been present since the early 1970s. 
Just as they facilitated the resurgence of warfare at the end of the colonial era, 
they now contribute to the intensification of election-related violence. 
Whilst Rotberg emphasises the importance of political goods in the establishment 
of the social contract, which is at the heart of state-society interactions, he appears 
to underestimate the underlying cultural c.onstraints facing governments in weak 
states. In PNG, the weak traditions of civil politics foster the endurance of 
kinship affiliations. People maintain their loyalty to their kinship groupings, 
because they find their emotional, physical and material security within their 
primordial communities. 
Primordialism, modernisation theory and weak state theory all make a 
considerable contribution to the understanding of how various social and political 
factors contribute to election-related violence. However, as meta-theories each is 
69 
limited to explaining the specific dimension of election-related violence in PNG. 
Their differing assumption~ give them partial explanatory power. Aspects of 
violence cannot be examined in isolation. A comprehensive explanation of 
election-related violence demands a synthesis that brings together the historical, 
cultural, sociological and political factors. Given that each country has a different 
history and unique cultural practices, an assessment of election-related violence 
can only be fully effective if it is case specific. Elections are at the heart of any 
democracy. The analysis of the debacle of the 2002 elections in the Highlands 
stresses a need for electoral conflict prevention policies if democracy is to be 
strengthened in PNG. These policies can only be responsive if they tackle the 
problem through an overarching approach, which is yet to be developed. 
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Appendix A - Seats won by party endorsed candidates, 2002 
Party Number of winners declared 
National Alliance Party 19 
People's Democratic Movement 12 
People's Progress Party 8 
Papua and Niugini Union Paty (Pangu) 6 
People's Act~on Party 5 
People's Labour Party 4 
Christian Democratic Party 3 
Melanesian Alliance Party 3 
Papua New Guinea National Party 3 
United Party 3 
Nation Transformation Party 2 
Pan Melanesian Congress Party 2 
People's National Congress Party 2 
People's Solidarity Party 2 
Pipol First Party 2 
Rural Pi pol's Pati 2 
Advance PNG Party 1 
National Vision for Humanity Party 1 
One People Party 1 
PNG Country Party 1 
PNG First Party 1 
PNG Labour Party 1 
PNG Revival Party 1 
United Resources Party 1 
Independent 17 
Source: PNGEC (2006, online). 
82 
Appendix B - Endorsed winning candidates by political party in the 
Highlands 
Electorates Candidate Party 
Chimbu Provincial Louis Ambane National Alliance Party 
Chuave Open DavidAngo Nation Transformation Party 
GumineOpen NickKKuman Independent 
Karimui-Nomane Open Posi Menaz Independent 
Kerowagi Open Alphonse M Willie National Alliance Party 
Kundiawa Open Mathew N Siune People's Democratic Movement 
Sinasina-Y onggamugl Open Jeffery Nape National Alliance Party 
Eastern Highlands Provincial Malcolm S Kela Independent 
Daulo Open Ben M Kiagi United Party 
Goroka Open B ire Kimisopa United Party 
Henganofi Open Tota B Bun Christian Democratic Party 
Kainantu Open Yuntuvi Bao People's Labour Party 
Lufa Open Yawa Silupa National Alliance Party 
Obura-Wonenara Open John Koigiri People's Solidarity Party 
Okapa Open TomAmukele Pipol First Party 
Unggai-Bena Open Benny T Allan Independent 
Enga Province Peter Ipatas People's Democratic Movement 
Lagaip-Porgera Open Yarka Kappa Independent 
Kandep Open Don P Pullie Polye National Alliance Paty 
Kompiam-Ambum Open Dickson M Maki PNG Country Party 
Wabag Open Samuel T Abal People's Democratic Movement 
Wapenamanda Open Y angakun M Kaeok People's Labour Party 
Southern Highlands Provincial Failed 
Kagua-Erave Open Failed 
Komo-Magarina Open Failed 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Failed 
Ialib.u-Pangia Open Peter o·'Neill People's Solidarity Party 
Imbonggu Open Failed 
Mendi Open Michael B N ali People's Progress Party 
Nipa-Kutubu Open Robert Kopaol People's Progress Party 
Tari Open Failed 
Western Highlands Provincial Paias Wingti People's Democratic Movement 
Angalimp-South Wahgi Open Paul WWai Christian Democratic Party 
Dei Open Melchior Pep PNG National Party 
Baiyer-Mul Open Kuri Kingal Independent 
Hagen Open William Duma !dependent 
Jimi Open Francis K Kinde PNG National Party 
North Wahgi Open Michael M Kal PNG National Party 
Tambul-NebilyerOpen MarkS Anis Christian Democratic Party 
Sources: PNGEC, 2007, online; Post-Courier, 1 August 2002, pp 12-16. 
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Appendix C - Coalition governments since 1972 
Year Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister Reason for change 
1972 Michael Somare (Pangu) Julius Chan (PPP) National elections 
1977 Michael Somare (Pangu) Julius Chan (PPP) National elections 
1980 Julius Chan (PPP) Iambakey Okuk (NP) No-confidence vote 
1982 Michael Somare (Pangu) Paias Wingti (PDM) National elections 
1985 Paias Wingti (PDM) Julius Chan (PPP) No-confidence vote 
1987 Paias Wingti (PDM) Julius Chan (PPP) National elections 
1988 Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu) Ted Diro (PAP) No-confidence vote 
1992 Paias Wingti (PDM) Julius Chan (PPP) National elections 
1994 Julius Chan (PPP) Chris Haiveta (Pangu) Court ousted PM 
1997 Bill Skates (PNC) Chris Haiveta (Pangu) National elections 
1999 Mekere Morauta (PDM) John Pundari (PAP) PM resigned 
2002 Michael Somare (NA) Allan Marat (PPP) National elections 
Note: From 1972 the government leader Michael Somare was Chief Minister, and at Independence in 
1975 the same coalition continued in office with Somare and Chan as Prime Minister and Deputy. 
Key: Pangu = Pangu Pati; PPP =People's Progress Party; NP =National Party; NA =National Alliance; 
PDM =People's Democratic Movement; PAP= People's Action Party; PNC =People's National 
Congress 
Source: Okole (2002). 
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Appendix D- Census (18 years & older), Common Roll and Vote Analysis 
by Province 
Region Province 2000 Census 18+ 2002 Vote Ratio 
Southern Western 75 403 63 739 84.53% 
Southern Gulf 52 535 47 000 89.46% 
Southern Central 94 609 94 583 99.97% 
Southern NCD 149 834 82 725 55.21% 
Southern Milne Bay 110 085 87 967 79.91% 
Southern Northern 66 666 61295 91.94% 
Highlands Southern Highlands 300 654 n/a n/a* 
Highlands Eng a 169 258 326 842 193.10% 
Highlands Western Highlands 253 984 399 901 157.45% 
Highlands Chimbu 155 475 442 680 284.73% 
Highlands Eastern Highlands 239 869 417 498 174.05% 
Momase Morobe 289 225 212 601 73.51% 
Momase Madang 181 604 152 919 84.20% 
Momase East Sepik 170 935 159 757 93.46% 
Momase West Sepik 92 696 84 534 91.19% 
Islands Manus 22 481 18 772 83.50% 
Islands New Ireland 60 354 45 158 74.82% 
Islands East New Britain 112 858 72 202 63.98% 
Islands West New Britain 92 949 67 733 72.87% 
Islands North Solomon 86 598 49 668 57.35% 
* The Electoral Commission failed the elections in six Southern Highlands electorates 
Source: PNGEC (2003). 
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Appendix E - Comparison of the 1997 and 2002 vote in the Highlands 
Provinces 
I Province 1997 Vote 2002 vote Ratio 
Southern Highlands 296 488 n/a n/a 
Eng a 207 868 326 842 57.24% 
Western Highlands 233 463 399 901 71.29% 
Chimbu 239 895 442 680 84.53% 
Eastern Highlands 221 818 417 498 88.22% 
Total 1199 532 1586 921 75.73% 
Note: There might be variations in the total increase figure due to the lack of data in SHP. 
Source: PNGEC (2003). 
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